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ABSTRACT
As with many other large-scale infrastructure projects, the construction of a transit
project is potentially vulnerable to quality failures, which can lead to completion delays
and cost overruns. Especially with technologically advanced, new-start transit projects, a
limitation or lack of skilled labor can exacerbate those risks. This thesis examines the
case of Tren Urbano in San Juan, Puerto Rico, a rapid rail project currently being
constructed in an area with limited on-island experience in the design, construction,
operation or maintenance of such a technologically sophisticated transit system. The
motivating question for this thesis is, does training matter for construction quality?
The research findings of this thesis show that the multiple prime contractors
operating under similar contractual arrangements and resource conditions in San Juan
exhibit variations in the quality of construction. Research findings also reveal variations
in the type of training programs established by the contractors. A limited conclusion is
drawn that although training of inexperienced labor does not single-handedly insure high
quality of construction, it nevertheless is important to the successful implementation of
project design. Thus, this thesis argues that in order to maximize the quality of
construction in a new transit system, the client-owners should create an appropriate
strategy which carefully assesses and matches three factors: 1) procurement strategy,
whether the conventional design-bid-build or innovative design-build arrangement, 2)
contractor competence and experience, and 3) the existent local labor skill level or
training capacity.
A successful procurement strategy for the construction of future extensions to
Tren Urbano should therefore consider: 1) choosing best-value bids over low bids, where
the contractor has exhibited expertise and 2) training a broad range of skill sets, that
includes explicit attention paid to the construction laborers and monitoring inspectors
crucial for the quality of construction. Successful training should be tailored to pre-empt
potential breakdowns of a particular procurement strategy. Furthermore, the training
should also be an intentional, collaborative effort between the public education sector, the
private construction sector, and an expanded labor union presence, and should fit within
an overall industrial development policy of the government. An important theoretical
contribution of this thesis is the expansion of the technology transfer discourse from a
focus on an educated managerial class to include the ramping-up of skills for low-skilled,
often uneducated, labor in order to expand the labor market for economic development
while improving the profitability of the private sector ventures utilizing local labor.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The employment issue is important for not only the FTA workforce, but also our transit
industry workforce. Policies and procedures do not build projects -people build projects.
Transit is not about tracks - it's all about people. We face many challenges in terms of
attracting the right kind of professionals who need to understand issues of complexity
when building large projects or meeting the mobility needs of various constituent groups.
- Jenna Dorn, FTA Administrator
1.0 Introduction
The growth of a transit system occurs either by the expansion of the system
through extensions to existing infrastructure, or by the start of a new system that is often
reliant upon new technologies. The complexity of fundamental inputs, processes and
networks that must first be established usually make the introduction of a new more
difficult than extensions to existing systems. Further challenges are posed when a
population of engineers, architects and other design professionals, as well as construction,
operations and maintenance professionals inexperienced in the new technology must
implement the new system.
Technology transfer programs were introduced to facilitate learning in the process
of transferring technologies to new locations. While originally a concept in
manufacturing industries, the infrastructure development industry has also taken hold of
the technology transfer paradigm. Yet, often, technology transfer programs are geared
towards a more educated level of people shaped to become the future managerial
professionals and leaders within the industry at the local level. This visionary, long-term
strategy is a necessary and crucial objective that should be met in the implementation of a
new technological system. Technology transfer programs for managers, however, do not
necessarily address the problems incurred on the site of actual construction or service
provision.
In the development of large-scale infrastructure projects such as that of transit
systems, the construction industry often experiences problems of cost overrun, time delay
and/or sub-standard quality work. Although it is common in the construction industry
for budgets to escalate beyond original estimates, cost controls for certain projects are
better managed than others. The same is true of meeting a target schedule in project
delivery. The quality of construction is particularly problematic in locations which are
inexperienced with technologically advanced infrastructure projects, such as in
developing country contexts. The accessibility to, and quality of material inputs is often
the focus of discussion surrounding construction quality improvements. Yet, the
craftsmanship of the laborer -the ability to use new technology and materials by
implementing appropriate processes and techniques -may be a significant factor in
construction quality that is ignored by managers.
1.1 Research Question and Objectives
This thesis addresses the issues of knowledge transfer and the development of
skills for inexperienced laborers in the construction of new transit systems. Thus, the
motivating question for this thesis is, does training matter for construction quality? To
the degree that it does, what types of institutions and training structures can help to
ensure a quality product from inexperienced construction labor?
The case of Tren Urbano in San Juan, Puerto Rico provides a rich case in which
to study the problems of construction quality, and potential strategies for the role of
knowledge transfer and training. Tren Urbano, Spanish for the Urban Train, is a
technologically sophisticated rapid rail system which is currently in its construction phase
in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Under a special arrangement with the Federal Transit Authority
(FTA), Tren Urbano has been designated as one of five demonstration projects for an
innovative procurement strategy which has, to date, not been widely used in the U.S. for
transit construction. The contracts for the design and construction of Tren Urbano have
been established as design-build arrangements with four civil engineering contractors for
six of the alignment sections. A fifth contractor has been assigned the responsibilities of
commissioning and integrating, operating and maintaining the entire system under a
turnkey -design-build-operate-maintain -contract.
In addition to being one of the first cases for U.S. design-build for the
construction of a transit system, Tren Urbano is Puerto Rico§ first modem rail-transit
system. The previously existing streetcars and trains ceased operation over 50 years ago.
With the lack of experience in current rail technology, the local capacity to manage and
implement the construction, operation and maintenance of the system is low at this time.
Already, a plethora of problems in the construction of Phase I have lead to
multiple quality reports, such as change orders calling for rework, non conformance
reports, and a 2+ year delay in systems opening and operation. Yet, according to the
Tren Urbano Master Plan, five additional extensions are being considered. Already, the
preliminary engineering work, environmental impact analysis for the 2km Minillas
Extension (Phase lA) has already been completed by the PRHTA. Designed to be
completely underground, the project is estimated to cost $478 million (Mirandes, 2001).
Map 1.1: Tren Urbano Master Plan
With the general question of the role of training in construction quality on the one
hand, and the specific implications of the analysis for Tren Urbano on the other hand, the
objectives of this thesis are twofold:
1. This thesis attempts to contribute to the wider discourse on training for the
construction of a new transit system, presumed to be of interest to the FTA,
local governments, design and engineering contractors, and international loan
institutions such as the World Bank.
2. This thesis will offer specific recommendations for improved construction
management and labor performance in the construction of future extensions,
presumed to be of particular interest to the Puerto Rico Highway and Transit
Authority. Towards that end, this thesis will also identify areas where the
level of skilled labor has contributed to the construction quality outcomes of
Phase 1.
Training and workforce development are critical to develop the next generation of
transportation construction professionals. One of the major purposes of this research is to
help improve the framework for the human resource management of a technologically
advanced transit system such as that of rail rapid transit. More specific to Tren Urbano,
the findings of this research are intended to inform the overall management strategy of
human resource development in both the management and implementation of
construction for future extensions.
1.2 The Framework
As previously established, the design, construction, operations and maintenance
of a new-start transit system is particularly challenging because no pre-established
institutions or labor capacity exists to address these functions. Often, a lack of
institutions and training programs to cultivate the necessary skills within the new-start
region may also be lacking.
This thesis focuses on the construction quality aspect of a new-start transit
system. In discussion of construction quality, inspection plays a central role. The current
mainland-US model of transit infrastructure construction relies heavily on the monitoring
and inspection functions of a quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) system to ensure
quality outcomes. Presuming that a quality outcome is the responsibility of the
contractor, QA/QC is meant to control inputs (i.e., quality of materials) and outputs (i.e.,
products of work) of the construction process. A considerable amount of time and money
has been invested in developing, studying, recommending and establishing various
quality improvement schemes, including systems such as total quality management
systems (TMS), ISO 9000 quality assurance standards, and global benchmarking
practices (Mrawira et. al, 2002, Bubshait et. al, 1999, Jaafari 2000). The models of
quality control and quality assurance assume, however, that the construction industry has
the capacity to perform its functions, i.e., that a qualified labor pool already exists and
must therefore only be monitored to ensure conformity to specifications .
Construction quality is primarily left out of technology transfer discourse.
Technology transfer discussions tend to ignore the low-skilled construction laborers who
perform the initial construction work, although much literature exists on knowledge
transfer schemes aimed towards managers and management processes. Construction
quality, however, is an important meeting point between public and private objectives. In
the case of transit system construction, the transfer of knowledge benefits both the public
sector (usually with governments as the client-owner and commissioning agent of a
transit system) and the private sector (the engineering, architecture, construction
contractors and sub-contractors commissioned to design, build and sometimes operate or
maintain the transit project). For the public sector (i.e., government), knowledge
spillovers are sought to upgrade the productive potential of the citizenry, which can then
lead to economic development and growth for the society as a whole. For the private
sector (i.e., contractors), knowledgeable design and management professionals and
workers are sought to increase organizational productivity and quality levels, which can
then translate into improved performance in meeting cost, time and quality targets
necessary for profitability.
Procurement strategies influence the overall management and organization of
construction project delivery, which affects the types of skills necessary for contractors
and the government. The conventional procurement strategy for large transit
infrastructure projects has been a design-bid-build, where a complete design is
established before the project is put out for construction contractors to bid upon. An
alternative procurement strategy, design-build, has gained consideration within the last
ten years, and provides as little as 10% of a design before putting the project out to bid.
With more of the onus on the contractor for the design, as well as construction of the
project, a higher degree and breadth of competence and performance is expected from the
design-build contractors. A design-bid-build procurement strategy has a high degree of
design specifications at the outset of the project, while a design-build strategy
intentionally leaves the degree of design specification flexible to capitalize upon
contractors roprietary competencies and/or to achieve efficiency of fast-tracking (to be
discussed further in Chapter Two). But the relative responsibility for skill training is
usually not explicitly stated. Rather, the relative responsibilities for training and
developing a skilled labor force is implicitly assumed.
In this thesis, a framework for understanding when, how and why certain types of
training did and did not work will be established. Figure 1.1 below illustrates the
framework:
Figure 1.1: Skills-Design Specifications Framework
Degree of Final Design Completion
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Boxes A and B illustrate situations where the specificity of design is high. This is
usually the case for design-bid-build. The construction outcome is primarily dependent
upon the design specifications, and the contractors'abilities to conform to the pre-
established details.
Boxes C and D refer to situations where complete designs for the project as a
whole, i.e., sum of the parts, have not been pre-established as in design-bid-build. In
design-build, construction is allowed to begin before 100% of the complete designs have
been approved. This does not, however, translate into an endorsement for beginning
construction on components of the project without a design. Rather, the procurement
strategy allows for construction to begin on portions of the project which have complete
design already approved by the client-owner, even while other portions of the project
may still be in the design-approval process. Theoretically, then, design-build should also
have high specificity of design before construction of individual components, although
the aggregate whole is not at 100% design completion.
This thesis argues that the design-build strategy assumes high level skills of
contractors and workers (Box C). In the case of low level skills of contractors (Box D),
the effective strategy would be to either move them up vertically to the realm of Box C
by intensive and effective training programs, or to move them over horizontally to the
realm of Box B by changing guidelines on the degree and breadth of complete designs
necessary before construction begins. Since the focus of the thesis is skills training on
the work site, the relevance of different procurement strategies is how those procurement
strategies may affect the need and/or training provision of work site skills.
Table 1.1 contrasts the two procurement strategies and an associated skill level
needed according to the stage of the transit construction (design, construction,
monitoring/inspection, and project oversight control) and actor (client-owner, contractor
management, construction labor). The four stages of transit construction - design,
construction, monitoring/inspection and project oversight control each identify the type
of skill needed for that particular stage. The stage and skill, in turn, are broken down into
the relevant actors of client-owner, contractor management and construction labor.
Although the type of skills needed do not vary much, which actor possesses the expertise
does vary according to the procurement strategy and the assignment of responsibility.
Table 1.1: Procurement Strategy and Associated Skills
L.
0
Actor
DESIGN-BID-BUILD DESIGN-BUILD
Very High: Provides 100% design specifications. Lon: Provides <100% design specifications
Client-Owner
Low: Not necessary; potential to change design Very High: Necessary to innovate and complete
Contractor specifications through value-engineering design specifications to 100%
Mangage-
memt
Construction
Labor
Client-Owner Moderate: Restrain payment schedule to match Moderate: Restrain payment schedule to match
construction compliance construction compliance
Moderate: Just implement 100% design Very High: Necessary to innovate and complete
Contractor specifications design specifications to 100% for quality
Mangage- construction
memt
Construction
k Labor High: Emphasize construction supervision to Very High: Emphasize construction supervision
implement 100% design to implement 100% design or need to exercise
judgment with incomplete design
Client-Owner
Very High: Reliance upon on QA/QC to Very High: Reliance upon on QA/QC to
monitor conformity to design specifications monitor conformity to design specifications
Q) Contractor High Very High
Mangage-
memt
Construction
Labor
Client-Owner
High: Necessary to coordinate contractors and Moderate: Reliance upon single contractoryto specifications entity to perform coordination functions
conformity tspcfaiosRestrain payment schedule to match
Restrain payment schedule to match construction compliance
construction compliance
Contractor Low Very High: Necessary to coordinate all
Mangage- subcontractors and functions
memt
Construction
Labor
While training alone does not assure quality, it is an influential enabling
mechanism to aid managers and laborers to improve their productivity and efficiency for
the benefit of an organization in particular, and a project in general. In the development
of transit systems, the match-up between a particular procurement strategy and the local
level of skill capacity is crucial. In deciding on a procurement strategy which maximizes
the quality of construction in a new transit system, the client-owners should also assess
a) the existing level of local construction experience, or b) the capacity to train the
construction management and labor pool where the project is located. After this initial
assessment, the procurement strategy should be either a) consistent with the capacity/
level of experience of the labor pool, or b) ensure appropriate training support for the
labor pool.
1.3 Methodology
The methodology for this study consists of two main features. First, a brief
review of the main theoretical literature is reviewed (Chapter Two). A discussion of the
construction industry and its impact on the general economy of a society is followed by
an overview of a conventional and an innovative project delivery/procurement strategy,
and the quality control/quality assurance systems utilized. Finally, potential for local
capacity development through training offered through existing public education systems,
professional associations and labor union, and a collaborative provision between the
public system, private contractors, professional associations and labor unions is reviewed.
Second, the case study approach is used to compare the quality construction
records and training experiences of the Alignment Section Contract (ASC) Contractors in
the Tren Urbano project. All the contractors operated under similar conditions, yet their
work yielded different levels of outcomes. Within the case study, an assessment of the
Puerto Rican context for a new transit system is made (Chapter Three). This includes the
Puerto Rican construction industry experience, the educational/vocational opportunities,
and professional associations and labor unions function in training. Then a review of
contract clauses addressing training and contractor performance is made.
The Tren Urbano Case is then summarized and analyzed relative to the
framework established in preceding chapters (Chapter Four). Information and data were
collected through interviews via phone, e-mail, and in person, of project managers of the
Tren Urbano/PRHTA and primary contractors, quality assurance/quality control
managers, STT commissioning managers in charge of integration and interface issues,
technology transfer managers and interns, international infrastructure development
project consultants of World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and lawyers of
the Tren Urbano Contracts. The performance of each ASC Contractor is assessed based
on the percentage of work completion to date, and the number of non-conformance
reports. The analysis of performance outcomes addresses three components: 1) degree of
design completion; 2) explicit training programs (formal, limited and informal) and who
provided it (private sector joint-ventures); and 3) the type of training that was successful
and unsuccessful.
1.4 Scope
The focus of this research is on the construction work on-site. While many
complaints about construction quality of Tren Urbano have been made, little analysis has
been done on identifying why systematic mistakes continue and how to avoid recurrence
in the future.
This research will not look at the indirect effects of an urban rail system as a
catalyst for increased labor mobility and access to jobs (Buentello, 2000), or at
transportation as a pre-cursor to economic development (Coloma, 1998). Instead, the
research will identify how increasing the technical capacity of even a few local Puerto
Rican contractors will have positive implications on the Puerto Rican construction
industry as a whole. This research will not emphasize knowledge upgrading for mid and
upper level engineers and managers within the construction of the Tren Urbano project
because an established technology transfer program has already been targeted to them for
advancing their skills. Similarly, this research will not emphasize the upgrading of
government capacity in order to operate and manage the growing San Juan transit system
because previous work has already been accomplished on this topic related to Tren
Urbano (Ardila, 2001).
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Its' tough. Workshops, information dissemination; there are so many issues.
But is' the nature of the best of design-build. You have to make changes as
you go along... there are disagreements, but there is dialogue.
- Steve Roescher, Siemens Project Administration Manager
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
In this chapter, I make a case for why knowledge-transfer can meet the profit
motives of the private sector and the economic development motives of the public sector.
First, I discuss the role of technology transfer in the economic development objectives of
developing countries, followed by an overview of the potential economic impacts of
construction industry investment. Second, I review the literature on construction project
delivery systems and procurement strategies, with an evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of design-bid-build and design-build. Third, I define and discuss the quality
assurance/quality control system for monitoring and inspecting construction. Fourth, I
make the case for why the conditions of a new-start transit system require a
corresponding strategy for local capacity development. Within this section, I discuss the
role of general education versus specific training, as well as review the potential
resources for skills training provision. Emphasis is placed on the role of labor unions and
associations, and other apprenticeship types of programs. Finally, I show what the
motivations for local capacity building for the public sector, private sector and labor
unions are, as well as how training should be a collaborative effort.
2.0 Introduction
The public and private sector share a common desire to realize a return on any
significant investment they make. A private sector investment must be profitable enough
to yield a financial return higher than the cost of the investment. The public sector,
though also interested in a profitable investment and a primary interest in achieving high
quality infrastructure and reasonable operation and maintenance requirements, plays an
additional role as the guardian of the public good. Thus, it often seeks to realize social
returns that do not readily translate into a monetary value, as well as to maximize positive
externalities. On the basis of quality assurance, then, the role of training and skills
development may suit both typically private as well as public sector goals. Knowledge-
transfer, thus, can meet dual objectives: on the one hand, it can ensure a better quality
product which can translate into more profitability, while on the other, it ensures local
capacity development and potential investment for future economic opportunities. In
order to maximize benefits to both the private and public sector, knowledge and skills
transfer must be carefully managed.
2.1 Economic Development Objectives
Large infrastructure projects such as the Tren Urbano major rapid rail transit
system provide a laboratory to investigate the dual objectives of the public and private
sector and their interaction. While the public sector -the FTA and PRHTA -and the
private -the various contractors and subcontractors in the construction, maintenance and
operations of the system -share the goal of establishing a well-functioning rail system,
the unique circumstance of Puerto Rico presents an interesting host of challenges. While
a U.S. Territory, the island has many features similar to other transitional and developing
countries around the world. Thus, like other developing countries, the Government of
Puerto Rico seeks to glean whatever knowledge she can from foreign investors for the
improvement of the conditions and capabilities of her citizens.
While theories of development for middle to low-industrializing countries remain
diverse, technological innovation and education are commonly cited in development
strategy literature (Amsden, 2001, Baumol and Wolff, 1996). An #idvantages of
backwardness"argument posits that imported goods from advanced countries offer a
direct transfer of information on new technology to a backward"country (Baumol and
Wolff, 1996, Tran, 1988). The theoretical debates continue, however, with counter-
arguments that such statements merely cloak the free-trade agenda of capitalist,
developed world economies. Regardless of which camp one lies theoretically, economic
growth in the midst of a very real, globalizing market implies that the receipt and
adaptation of new technologies are imperative to economic survival, as well as
industrialization and economic development.
For developing and transitional economies, access to new technologies and
associated processes usually arrives through the dissemination of foreign technologies
rather than through domestic innovations. Traditional technology transfer literature
posits that the foreign technologies, however, are not limited to the mere transference of
physical systems from an original user to a secondary user, but also includes the
knowledge base which undergirds the creation, operation, and innovation of that physical
system.
One of the motivating factors behind technology transfer schemes is that
recipients would learn new technical processes and develop a capacity to attain a greater
level of innovative capabilities. Amsden (2001) breaks technological knowledge into two
categories: know-how and know-why. Know-how types of knowledge include
production capabilities (i.e., design, manufacturing, low level operation and
maintenance) and project execution capabilities (i.e., engineering, operation and
maintenance, management capacities). Know-why types of knowledge include more
advanced innovation capabilities that embody research and development (R&D). Such
knowledge-based assets" are the foundation of many globalizing firms and
industrializing country strategy (Amsden, 2001). The following table maps out the logic:
Table 2.1: Levels of Skills - Level of Development
Level of Economic Level of Skill in an Industry
Development
Dependency Foreign workers necessary for establishment and maintenance of the
foreign technological system
Subsistence Enough skills for local operation but nothing more; not necessarily
reliant upon foreign workers
Innovation, independence, Learning takes place, and expansion on given skills for new
exporter creations; majority are local workers
As the scheme outlined in Table 2.1 describes, movement from dependency to
subsistence to an innovative economic position has a corresponding level of skill
associated within an industry, as well as composition of experienced foreign workers and
newly-skilled local workers.
Technology transfer schemes are limited, as they traditionally focus upon an
educated cadre of professionals of mid to upper management levels. This obscures the
often important need for upgrading skills of lower status workers, who are often less
educated. Successful transference of information and skills, however, must occur at all
levels of production -'6n the ground"as well as managerial - for two reasons. First, a
better quality outcome will result if knowledge and skills are escalated by labor at all
points within the production, or in the case of Tren Urbano, construction process.
Second, ramping up low-skilled labor to a higher degree of skill and incorporating more
people into the labor force by equipping them to work addresses the overall economic
challenge of employment generation for the society as a whole rather than for the select
few. For instance, while industries such as the hi-tech sector have a high education and
earnings ratio in Puerto Rico, the gap between the high-skilled, high-earnings worker and
the low-skilled labor continues to increase. Such a comprehensive measure for
knowledge-transfer requires an intentional and strategic intervention to facilitate the
process.
2.1.1 Economic Impacts of Construction Industry Investment
Traditionally, scholars have attempted to explain the link between transportation
and economic development. Transportation is viewed as one of the factors for the means
of production. Thus, a better transportation system can lower the costs of transporting
both material supplies, and laboid access to work (Ardila, 2000, Buentello, 2000).
Similarly, the construction phase of a transportation system, especially a large-scale,
multi-phase, technologically advanced rapid rail transit line, is also an important
stimulant to economic development. The construction phase of a project consists of
physically building the transportation infrastructure, including the manufacture and
installation of any subsystems, as well as testing for proper functioning (Lee, Sheehan
and Mattson, 1995).
Construction can be linked to economic development in three ways. First,
construction has an indirect effect on the economy due to its influence on the profitability
of the transit system. A poorly constructed transit system can diminish profitability by
generating increased costs in the short run (due to rework) and in the long run (due to
higher maintenance needs). Similarly, a poorly constructed transit system may
discourage potential riders either because it is perceived to be poor quality and therefore
unsafe, or it actually does not function properly. Second, construction can stimulate
employment generation. While it may not be the most widespread source of new jobs in
the long term, it is nevertheless a crucial source. Construction jobs are temporary and
seasonal, for they disappear once the facility is completed. Conversely, construction jobs
provide opportunities for otherwise unemployed laborers to join the formal labor market
or ramp up on their skills and productivity (Coloma, 1998). Third, the increased input of
technical skills into the construction industry can instigate further growth of that sector
for future infrastructure development and capabilities to do similar projects domestically,
or as an export that industry. It is important to absorb new skills in order to develop the
capability to innovate.
2.2 Construction Project Delivery System/Procurement Strategies
Increased public-private management of large infrastructure projects has brought
greater private sector influence upon the delivery of infrastructure projects. Increased
pressure to maximize a return on investment by maximizing efficiency and minimizing
costs has created a renewed interest on various aspects of improving the efficiency, as
well as quality, of infrastructure projects. As Mrawira writes, The key motivation for
public-private-partnership delivery mechanism includes an unprecedented increase in the
demand for infrastructure, the shrinking of public funds relative to infrastructure renewal
and upkeep needs, and the potential for increased efficiency in private sector operations."
(Mrawira, et. al, 2002).
2.2.1 Conventional: Design-Bid-Build
Design-bid-build is the conventional project delivery system where the client-
owner contracts separately with a designer and a constructor (Konchar and Sanvido,
1998). Traditionally, the design must be complete before bids for construction can be
solicited. Transit infrastructure in the US has traditionally been built using design-bid-
build. In this strategy, the transit property client-owner hires an engineer to completely
design a project, usually including stations, tunnels, systems and line sections. The
completed designs are then put out for construction firms to bid, with the lowest-price bid
usually winning the contract. Such a process is considered to ensure responsible,
accountable engineering and as fair and transparent contracting process as possible.
Strengths
The design-bid-build strategy specifically provides more opportunity for the
client-owneid control and input over design. A transit agency requiring a high degree of
specificity for station or above-ground structures, may seek to maximize quality by
exerting a great amount of control over the design. In such a case, design-bid-build
would allow the agency to exercise the most direct and simplest amount of control over
the design specifications.
Weaknesses
The high level of design specificity before bidding in a design-bid-build contract,
however, also has its drawbacks. Information sharing and interaction usually occurs at
the end of the design phase, with each separately contracted firm focusing entirely on its
assigned portion, whether it be design or construction. With the increasing specialization
of services, however, some observers conclude that this has been found to lead to
Inefficient designs, increased errors and disputes, higher costs, and ultimately longer
schedules."(Konchar and Sanvido, 1998, 435)
2.2.2 Innovative: Design-Build
Design-build has traditionally been a popular contracting methodology for the
private sector. Within the U.S., design-build has been used within the auto and housing
construction industries (Smith, 2002). The design-build experience has had limited usage
within transit infrastructure, being limited to the procurement of large highway and
bridge projects (Konchar and Sanvido, 1998). While a common project delivery method
for transit construction in Europe and Asia, the U.S. experience has been limited.
Recently, however, the U.S. Congress enacted specific authorization enabling federal
contracting offers to use design/build for construction in the public sector.
In its most pure form, design-build is a project delivery system where the client-
owner contracts with a single entity to perform both design and construction functions in
a single design/build contract (Konchar and Sanvido, 1998). The contrast in methods of
project delivery between traditional and design-bid are described in Figure 2.1 below:
Figure 2.1: Comparison Project Delivery Methods
Traditional Design-Build I Design-Build II Desien-Build III
CO CO CO CO
AA C C A
A C
Key: CO = Client-Owner A=Architect C=Contractor
Source:Mike Smith, Architectfor Equus Group, 2002.
In a traditional project delivery mechanism, the client-owner contracts separately
with an architecture firm for design, and a contractor for construction. In design-build,
however, the client-owner contracts with a single entity, which will have the sole
responsibility and accountability for both the design and construction of a project. The
single source of responsibility can exist in a company which has both architecture and
contractor functions in-house (Design-Build I above), a contractor who then subcontracts
an architecture firm (Design-Build II above) or an architecture firm who then
subcontracts a contractor (Design-Build III). Of the three design-build variations, the
Design-Build II model is the most common, with the Design-Build III model very rarely
ever seen (Smith, 2002).
One form of design-build, design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM), is a
procurement strategy where the contractor is given the operations and maintenance
responsibilities for a designated number of years. This provides incentive for the
contractor to design and construct with the longer time operations and maintenance
prospects in mind, thereby creating a higher quality outcome. Additionally, design-build-
operate-maintain establishes a contractor in an area for an initial number of years to help
establish a professional capacity for the operations and maintenance of the system.
Strengths
Design-build allows maximum utilization of design documents by allowing the
contractor to use as much of the incomplete design as possible while waiting for the
finally approved and accepted design specifications to be returned. In design-build,
construction can begin on as little as 10 % of a pre-established design, with the contractor
given responsibility for bringing the design to completion. This allows the project to
proceed under the competitive pressures to avoid delay, thereby increasing efficiency in
time and cost savings. The lure of these alternative methods lies primarily in their
ability to compress the schedule by overlapping design and construction and to create
team synergies that can often expedite the project."(Ernzen and Feeney, 2002). In a
survey of 351 building projects, Sanvido of the Construction Industry Institute found that
design-build projects averaged 33% faster completion than traditional design-bid-build
projects (Ernzen and Feeney, 2002).
The touted benefit and strongest motivation for creating a design-build contractual
arrangement is because it provides a fast completion at low cost. Some elements of
construction do not need 100% design before construction can begin. A decreased staff
capacity and personnel available in a transit agency provides an additional incentive to
delegate a greater amount of functions to the contractor. Additionally, the containment of
responsibility within a single entity is argued to provide greater opportunity to manage
interfaces in various aspects of the design, construction and sometimes even operation of
the product or service. Incentives for an accelerated schedule and economies of scale are
also projected benefits of a single entity for turnkey contracts.
Weaknesses
A discussion of design-build as an appropriate procurement strategy for transit
system construction has led to an influx of recent studies. A delegation of representatives
from the International Transit Studies Program conducted a study of Asian Infrastructure
projects using the design-build strategy (Stark, 2001). They find that projects in areas of
unknown or difficult environmental conditions may prove to be very expensive due to the
amount of the contractoid price attributed to risk, while projects in well-known
conditions where risk allocation is low may be the most optimal conditions for innovation
in design and methods (Stark, 2001). Environmental conditions include civil
engineering elements such as ground conditions and development density, as well as
political and community relations factors as well. The Stark study concludes that larger
or single design-build contracts with multiple contracts create interface problems which
may negate the 'avings inherent"in the design-build method.
The literature appears mixed on what are the most appropriate conditions for
design-build to work. On the one hand, simple designs where innovation is desired, and
where construction conditions are known are seen as the less-risky environment for
greater risk opportunities to be taken (Stark, 2001). On the other hand, design-build is
meant to maximize contractor flexibility and responsiveness to avoid lengthy design
reviews and approvals for unknown conditions. What seems problematic or dubious,
however, hinges upon the assumption that a long term construction program has
developed a competent, stable, and professional workforce that is up to the task of
innovation and less-controlled design specifications.
The successful use of design-build hinges upon the coordination of all the
components within the design and construction process in order to minimize the
incidence of claims due to errors and omissions. If each of the individual components is
functioning properly, and communicating as well as coordinating well with the other
components, a synergy results. For instance, the level of interaction between design and
construction is critical to the execution of a design-build contract. If there is little
communication or coordination, the potential to have inappropriate designs lead the
construction effort can result. The inappropriate designs could be due to either a lack of
construction site information flow going to the designer, or, the commencement of the
work without final design approval.
2.3 Quality Control/Quality Assurance (QA/QC)
With the multiplicity of actors and complexity of contracts within a design-build
procurement system, a mechanism to ensure quality becomes all the more important. A
quality control management systems provides a system of accountability by the client-
owner to the contractors, as well as a device for monitoring the work of several actors.
Mrawira et. al (2002) identify the primary actors involved in most public-private
partnerships in highway mega-projects as the client-owner (public), agent of the client-
owner (private), project developer team comprised of financiers, designers, builders, and
an operation and maintenance company (private). 'Given the diversity of the parties and
ensuing complexity of the contractual relationships, a quality management system
becomes extremely important,"( Mrawira et. al, 2002).
Definition
Quality has been defined as the conformance to established requirements"which
includes meeting the satisfaction of the user, client or public (Mrawira et. al, 2002).
Quality assurance is important to avoid inefficiencies or other deviance from the
specified standards of the project. According to Bubshait and Al-Atiq (1999), a quality
management system is an internal quality system which executes activities aimed at
providing confidence to the management of an organization that the intended quality is
being achieved"while a quality assurance system is an external quality system which
executes activities aimed at inspiring confidence in the client that the supplieid quality
system will provide a product or service that will satisfy the clienv quality
requirements' According to the American Society for Quality Control (ANSI/ASQC
Standard Q90-1987) and FTA QA/QC Guidelines, the definitions for QA and QC are
(Enfiedjian et. al, 1997):
e Quality Control -the operational techniques and activities that are used to
fulfill requirements for quality, i.e., techniques to ensure that products or
services meet the specifiedrequirements and goals. QC techniques include
measuring, testing, inspecting and documenting processes or products such as
specifications, manufactured equipment or constructed items.
e Quality Assurance -all those planned and systematic actions necessary to
provide adequate confidence that a product or service satisfies given quality
requirements. QA activities include ensuring project requirement
development to meet the needs of relevant agencies, planning processes to
assure quality, assuring equipment and staffing capabilities to execute project
quality tasks, ensuring contractor capability to execute quality requirements,
and documentation of all such efforts.
Quality Control tends to be comprised of field inspectors who check that engineering
requirements are met and conformity to specifications are ensured. Quality Assurance
tends to be comprised of managers who develop, institute, and assure that activities are
geared to ensuring quality outcomes.
Non-conformance to established specifications or a poor quality facility result in
increased short-term costs of time and finances for penalty fines and correction for the
unacceptable work; long-term costs of increased maintenance and repair of reduced
safety or premature failures and loss of user satisfaction can also result.
The assumed norm of the contractor is that 'doing the job right the first time"
would be more profitable, and the QA/QC functions would provide only a secondary
accountability and check mechanism that would Pubber-stamp"effective progress on a
work product. Some processes add value to a project, while others provide little to no
value relative to the output of the process (Kirmani and Blaxall, 1988). Value-added
refers to the difference between the value of a constructed product and the value of
materials and services purchased from suppliers. Bubshait and Al-Atiq (1999) identify
delays in processing, temporary or permanent storage, inspections and rework as non
value-added activities, with value-added processes being defined when a noticeable
change desired by the customer occurs, a customer would pay for the extra work, or the
activity is done correctly the first time. From a contractoid perspective, then, it would
appear that 'doing the job right the first time"being a value-added activity would be
preferable to retroactive rework which is a non value-added activity.
In a turnkey project, QA and QC responsibilities are assigned to the contractor,
who in turn must prepare a Quality Program Plan to be approved by the client-owner. In
the US, the approved program must conform to FTA guidelines and include any work of
the subcontractors (Enfiedjian et. Al, 1997). This, then, is incorporated into contract
documents. With the burden of quality control and assurance on the contractor, the client-
owned role in ensuring quality is that of t4uality oversight'.'
2.4 The Conditions of a New Transit System
In the development of transit systems, the construction industry often experiences
problems of cost overrun, time delay and/or sub-standard quality work. The construction
of new-start transit systems is more complex than extensions to existing systems because
all the inputs of the system must first be established. A first-time population of
designers, constructors, operators and maintenance crews of a new transit system face the
challenge of learning an innovative technology. Improvements in cost, time and quality
goals are dependent upon increased productivity and quality levels of management and
labor. Improvements to management and labor performance, in turn, are dependent upon
the identification and development of enabling factors and attributes which help them to
function better. Yet, the literature often studies labor issues based on quantitative
analysis of productivity due to equipment improvements (Koehn and Atuahene, 1994),
with little mention of the need for how to equip people to use the equipment, as well as
other appropriate proceesses and techniques. Therein lies the role for local capacity
development through training.
2.5 Local Capacity Development
The growth in sophistication and technology of the construction industry requires
a growth in technical skills, as well as many other skills associated with more complex
jobs: risk management, marketing, financial control, competitive bidding, protecting
contractual rights, managing labor, and training the workforce (Kirmani and Blaxall,
1988). As an official at the World Bank puts it (Kirmani, 1988, p.7),
The most striking feature of the industry is the division of production
responsibility among many participants -owners, designers, contractors,
subcontractors, material suppliers, equipment dealers, funding institutions
and services such as transport, electricity and water. These participants
perform various functions and belong to different organizations with
different policies, objectives and practices. In this situation, the contractor
is primarily a resource manager of men, materials, equipment, money and
time, and a coordinator of the activities of many participants who are not
directly responsible for the final product and over whom he has little
control.
Jaafari argues that in the construction industry today, there needs to be a shift in
emphasis from project quality management to construction organization performance,
with special attention paid to the organization and human factors of the construction
company (Jaafari, 2000). Opportunity for skills development occurs at every level and
every phase of a construction project: management of the organization, quality assurance.
This can result in accrued benefits to the projectg constructed outcome and accrued
benefits to the companies doing the work.
A long-term program for capacity-building in the construction industry, and the
short-term project goals of construction completion are interdependent. Some argue that
developing the construction industry is necessary for the host economy, and should thus
be program-based rather than project-based (Kirmani, 1988). A program involves a
public strategy involving actors from a variety of institutions in the private and public
sectors, as well as leaders who have a vision and a strategy. At the same time, a private
sector contractor must still meet his profit goal for the specific project. Training for
project-specific activities should be incorporated into institutional development for
longer-term development of the industry. Although training may be valued by an
innovative contractor to increase his competitive advantage for future projects, it is more
likely the governmeng objective to ensure the provision of training.
Incentives to invest in formal training in the construction industry are low, due to
the variance in requirements of skills for different jobs and the transience of the labor
force needed to do the job. The nature of construction work, as well as the necessary
skills create a myriad of challenges to develop the construction industry. The skills
needed range from technical concerns such as how to build in soil and weather conditions
cheaply and quickly, masonry work, placing concrete, formwork, power distribution
lines, maintenance and repair, to management concerns of multiple stakeholders involved
in a project with a diverse workforce. Acquiring the skills within the construction
industry can be slow in coming, often through teaming by doing"through a variety of
construction jobs (Amsden, 2001). Appropriate channels for training in construction,
then, can not be limited to just one sector.
2.5.1 General Education vs. Specific Training
According to Jaafari (2000), general education, skills and aptitude and specific
training for specific purposes are two differentiated yet key aspects of training and
education that are critical to building a successful construction business. He argues that
the education system of the locale supplies the general education to create a skilled and
trained workforce to the industry, and should remain the responsibility of universities,
technical and vocational colleges, trade schools and apprenticeship schemes. Specific
training, however, is needed to create a more dynamic and responsive organization to
meet the needs of a competitive construction industry.
A basic education provided by the public sector (i.e., K-12) can increase the
aptitude for learning and an individua capacity to absorb new and complex
information, while specific skills training provides the technical competence for very
specific tasks. More formal schooling increases the basic learning skills and trainability
of an individual. This translates into a higher aibsorptive capacity"of an individual for
skills training (Amsden, 2001). Increasing the absorptive capabilities of a citizenry lays a
foundation for potential private sector investment to locate in an area for skilled labor.
2.5.2 Public Provision of Training
Existing federal programs may be a valuable resource for training in partnership
with the private sector. The U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training
Administration, Office of Apprenticeship Training, Employment and Labor Services
(OATELS) has created Apprenticeship programs to 'stimulate and assist industry in
developing and improving apprenticeship and other training programs designed to
provide the skilled workers needed to compete in a global economy."(US Department of
Labor, OATELS, 2002).
Established under the National Apprenticeship Act of 1937 (Fitzgerald Act) and
amendment 50 Stat. 664, and 29 U.S.C. 50, the legislation promotes labor standards of
apprenticeship. Sponsored by joint employer and labor groups, individual employers,
and/or employer associations, apprenticeships combine on-the-jobtraining with related
classroom instruction for high-skill occupations. A schedule of wages for the apprentice
is progressive according to satisfactory completion of related instruction and on-the-
jobtraining, based on the journeyworkers'hourly wage of the apprenticeg occupation,
with a maximum wage of 85-90% of the journeyworker rate. Completion of a one to four
year apprenticeship (ranging from 2000 to 8000 hours) results in the earning of an
Apprenticeship Completion Certificate, making the apprentice a recognized and qualified
journeyworker within the United States.
Programs registered with OATELS must meet the established requirements. An
apprenticeship Agreement between the apprentice and sponsor is a signed commitment
by the apprentice to perform the required work and study and by the sponsor to keep the
apprentice employed and to comply with program standards. Components of the
program include:
e Structured, supervised, on-the-jobtraining by a skilled craftsperson
e Supervisor reviews, evaluates, maintains records of the apprentices
job performance
e Required, supplemental related instruction, with 144 hours minimum
for each occupation through trade, industrial or correspondence course
or self study approved by the registered agency
The Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT) registers programs and
apprentices in the states where no other agency has been delegated the authority to do so.
Delegated authority to register apprenticeship programs by the Secretary of the US
Department of Labor, a State Apprenticeship Council (SACs) also has the responsibility
to protect the welfare of the apprentices, ensure quality and equality of access to
apprenticeship programs and provide integrated employment and training information to
sponsors and the local employment and training community."(OATELS website) 27
States, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico have SACs while the
remaining 23 states are BAT jurisdictions. The registered apprenticeship is t voluntary
industry-driven training program'.' Employers are eligible for the program with or
without labor union participation. Individuals are eligible to become apprentices if they
are at least 16 years old and meet program sponsor§ qualifications.
In addition to the U.S. Department of Labor efforts, the National Skill Standards
Board (NSSB) was created in 1994 by business, labor, employee, education, community
and civil rights organization leaders to build a voluntary national system of skill
standards, assessment and certification systems to enhance the ability of the United States
workforce to compete effectively in a global economy" (NSSB website, 2002).
According to the NSSB, the provision of training for construction labor has been limited.
It states,
Traditionally, the position of laborer has been considered at or near the
bottom of the construction industry when it came to formal training,
prestige, and wages. The vast majority of construction laborers have
learned the required skills through informal on-the-job training
provided by supervisors and more experienced workers. Historically,
neither technical schools nor community colleges have offered much
in the way of training programs for construction laborers. And it is
only within recent years that formal apprenticeship training has
become available for construction laborers, including a registered
apprenticeship program for construction craft laborers offered by the
US Department of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training
(BAT). ( italics mine, NSSB website, 2002).
In an attempt to address the increasingly complex needs of an increasingly sophisticated
construction industry, the NSSB has categorized the workforce into fifteen industry
sectors, and established an apprenticeship program for craft laborers in a variety of
specialized tasks.
The BAT Construction Craft Laborer Apprenticeship Program requires 4000
hours of on-the-job training and experience, as well as supplemental technical instruction
through classroom instruction, correspondence study, or home study. The employer is
required to provide a progressive wage schedule reflecting the additional skills gained
throughout the apprenticeship. 4000 hours of on-the-job training must be accrued for
successful completion of the apprenticeship program. 1600-2000 hours must be spent on
the acquisition of general construction skills, and 2000 to 2400 hours must be spent on
the acquisition of specific construction skills. As of March 2002, other NSSB identified
certification/apprenticeship programs for construction include:
e bricklayer and stone masonry work
e heavy industrial an commercial carpentry
e concrete and terrazzo work
" crane operators
e electrical work
* equipment operation, maintenance, and/or repair
e glass and tile installation
" heating, ventilation, air conditioning, and refrigeration,
e highways, streets and roadways,
e occupational health and safety
e special trades including plumbing, roofing, sheet metal, structural
steel, surveying and welding
In the formal schooling realm, vocational schools provide instruction in
techniques of a trade. While criticism of an impractical curriculum may exist, the
benefits of public provision of trade-specific training include wider access to the training
across a region, as well as a standardized skill set which can be verified through
certification.
2.5.3 Associations and Labor Unions
Kirmani (1988) argues that the reason why contractors do not invest in formal
training outside of the construction work is based upon the logic of a well-functioning
apprenticeship program. Apprenticeship models provide a mutually beneficial
arrangement for both the employer and the employee. The unskilled and semi-skilled
trainees can learn, while the contractor produces while he trains and is able to pay a lower
wage due to lower producitivity of the trainee. According to the guidelines for
apprenticeship models in the U.S., however, exploitation is avoided by mandating
progressively increasing wages corresponding to increased training levels.
A well-functioning construction industry should evolve dynamically, rather than
be dictated top-down or un-managed bottom-up. The concerns of the management and
implementation of on-site construction, thus, are an integral part of the healthy
development of the construction industry. Organized interests through contractor
associations and labor unions may not be a detraction as some would argue but a
necessary addition to the equation of a healthy construction industry. Contractor
associations and labor unions are major stakeholders who have a strong institutional
interest in the upgrading of skills, in combination with a practical understanding of the
skills needed.
Contractors associations provide an opportunity for contractors of an area to
promote the interests of the construction industry. Working in close association with
government, educational and training institutions, the professional standards and business
ethics of the industry can be developed through such associations (Kirmani and Blaxall,
1988).
In an area where foreign companies enter a local market, local contractors may
retain a competitive advantage in the recruitment of labor. Over time, they could weed
out workers to retain some of the most highly skilled and best workers on the island.
This provides them with local advantage over foreign fmns that must enter the island and
recruit new workers. Thus, the local contractor retains at least a partial monopoly on the
best skilled workers on the island. Labor unions can function as a third party to break the
monopoly of one particular entity or employer by providing training to a broader base of
laborers. Unions, too, would thus attempt to create its own monopoly on skilled labor,
but it is not exclusive to one particular company.
2.6 Provision of Training Services: A Collaborative Effort
The motivations of the public sector and the private sector may differ, but the
importance of training that both can hold in common. The public sector has two end
goals: quality service provision, and economic development. Thus, quality assurance and
local capacity development can be seen as vital to these two objectives, while it may be
sacrificed in the service of quick project completion for political gain.
The private sector must meet its bottom line of profit. This can be achieved
through increased profitability due to a better quality of construction which can then
translate into a better quality of service. Thus, local capacity development can be seen as
one of the many institutions (enabling environment') and indirect means to helping to
assure quality. Alternatively, the private sector can attempt to cut costs and produce a
lower quality product with as little investment in materials, workers, or other necessary
services.
Contractors who lack experience in the requisite skills for technologically
advanced and complex, large projects may gain the important and relevant skills most
quickly and cheaply through joint ventures or sub-contracting partnerships with
experienced contractors. Collaboration between inexperienced domestic and experienced
foreign contractors, as well as between large and small firms is also necessary.
Local capacity-building through the education and training of human capital may
serve different functions within the public sector and private sector. For both the public
sector and the private sector, local capacity development is most prominently seen as an
environmental condition which enhances a process for the assurance of a high quality
product or service. Although the public sector seeks a high quality outcome as a means
for a quality service outcome, the public sector also seeks local capacity development as
a means towards economic development through employee enhancement. Figure 2.2
illustrates the issues below:
Figure 2.2: Motivation for Local Capacity Building of Public and Private Sector
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The task of creating construction industry training institutions is difficult because
construction involves multi-sectoral activities and does not conveniently fit into any one
particular sectoral ministry. Often, the industry is housed within the Ministry of Public
Works. Kirmani and Baxall (1988) suggest that an effective institution would have a
multi-disciplinary staff with representatives involved from ministries of public works,
education industry, finance and planning. As a permanent institution, they argue, the
institution should monitor and evaluate the industry activities, policy and strategy
effectiveness, and performance indicators of value added, cost effectiveness, quality of
work, and completion time.
The private sector may be the primary agent for training because the relevant and
practical skills can be immediately implemented, and because employers have a stake in
the quality. This can be ensured through the contract mechanism. According to an
interview with one Tren Urbano architect, the provision of high-skills training would be
better provided through private companies than through public education systems
Public Sector As Guardian of the Public Good.
Public Sector
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(Medina, Personal Interview , 2002). He cites reasons of internal promotion as a natural
impetus for professional development.
The provision and financing of training must be a collaborative effort by the
public and private sectors, as well as with an independent third party of labor unions.
Government institutions are necessary to establish a program which incorporates the
private sector project visions within the curriculum for training the construction industry
laborers. While the public sector has much to offer in education, a close link to industry
is vital for the practicability of a general education.
CHAPTER 3
THE PUERTO RICAN CONTEXT
Building the project may be the easy part.
The tough part will be using the infrastructure to build a better community.
- Representative Martin Sabo
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
In this chapter, I assess the Puerto Rican context and conditions for a new-start
transit system. First, I provide a general overview of the demographics, history, politics
and economic indicators of Puerto Rico. Second, I review the construction industry
experience in Puerto Rico, including her recent experiences with design-build, and
regulatory constraints placed on quality assurance/quality control. Third, I review labor
conditions, including general wage rates, structure of employment, union activity, and the
shortage of skilled labor in construction. Finally, I review the institutions available for
skills development.
3.0 Introduction
Historically an agrarian region, Puerto Rico has been transformed into a modem
industrial society with a high degree of urbanization. Puerto Rico has a land area of
8,876 square kilometers. According to the 2000 U.S. census, Puerto Ricos population
was 3.81 million, with 1.4 million people (36%) living within the San Juan metropolitan
region. Puerto Rico is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. The San
Juan Metropolitan Region has a population density of 3,500 people/square mile, while the
capital city of San Juan rivals New York City with a density of 8,500 people/square mile
at certain places. The population of the San Juan Metropolitan Area is expected to
increase by 20% by 2010 (EIU Country Profile, 2001; Mirandes, 2001; Izquierdo 2001).
The rich population density is combined with highly concentrated patterns of
development and a heavily motorized population. 63% of the jobs in the San Juan
metropolitan area are within San Juan, with 26% of the jobs in Bayam6n, Carolina, and
Guaynabo (Mirandes, 2001). The recent increase in economic prosperity has resulted in a
corresponding increase in consumption. The 1990 census revealed that 68.5% of
households had at least one car, with 25.9% having two or more as of 1989 (EIU Country
Profile, 2001). Puerto Ricans own 2.4 million cars, averaging approximately 620 cars for
every 1000 people. There are over 150 vehicles per mile of paved road, which is three
times more than the continental U.S. The San Juan metropolitan regional core holds close
to 4,300 cars per square mile (Izquierdo, 2001). There is high car ownership among low
income households.
3.0.1 The Puerto Rican Historical and Political Context
The unique circumstance of Puerto Rico lies in its relationship to the United
States as a Commonwealth. Puerto Rico became a U.S. protectorate in 1898 after the
Spanish-American war, after which the governor was appointed by the U.S. President
until 1948. 1948 brought the first set of direct elections, followed by a vote by a 1952 by
the U.S. Congress which proclaimed the official Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico.
The present Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico provides for local gubernatorial,
legislative and mayoral elections, as well as limited autonomy on tax issues, education,
social policies, criminal justice, and other local affairs. Authority over federal matters
such as defense, international relations, external trade and monetary policies remains with
the U.S. Although Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and can move to the mainland as full
U.S. citizens with full rights, they do not have the right to vote in U.S. presidential and
congressional elections in Puerto Rico, and do not pay federal taxes (EIU, Country
Profile, 2001).
The Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), which favors full U.S. statehood, governed
the island from 1993 to 2000, but was replaced by the Partido Popular Democratico
(PPD), which favors continuing status as a commonwealth. The current governor, Sila
Maria Calderon, is the first woman governor of the island to date (EIU, Country Profile,
2001).
3.0.2 The Puerto Rican Economic Context
The economy of Puerto Rico is a mixed bag of developing country and developed
country characteristics. The economic level is higher than other Latin American
countries with a per capita GDP of $9,052 in 1990, but is only three-quarters that of the
poorest mainland state of Mississippi (Baumol and Wolff, 1996).
Since 1975, the unemployment level has ranged between 15 and 20% of the labor
force, motivating a large emigration of temporary and permanent Puerto Ricans to
mainland cities. There has been virtually no restriction on emigration from Puerto Rico to
the mainland U.S. Additionally, Puerto Rico has experienced a low level of labor force
participation with high and increasing rates of unemployment. The average ratio of labor
force to population in Puerto Rico has changed little, averaging around 30% since 1950
in comparison to the mainland U.S. ratios of 40% from 1950-1970, 47% in 1980 and up
to 50% in 1990.
Table 3.1: Unemployment and Labor Force Participation
Period Unemployment Ratio of labor force
rate (%) to population (%)
1950-1960 14.1 29.5
1960-1970 11.6 28.5
1970-1980 15.1 30.1
1980-1990 18.7 30.6
1950-1990 14.9 29.7
Source: From Estudios Tenicos Inc. Macro-economic Database, and Office of the Governor of Puerto
Rico, Economic Information for the Governor, 1991 in Baumol and Wolff, 1996.
The average unemployment rate in 1993-1994 was 15%, but most recent data from
1999/2000 reports the unemployment rate to be at 11% (EIU, Country Profile 2001).
Traditionally, Puerto Rico has been heavily dependent upon the mainland U.S.
for federal funds for social programs and various incentives for private industrial
investment. One such incentive has been Section 936. Section 936 tax credits were
added to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service tax code in order to attract investment in
Puerto Rico in 1977, but will phase out by 2006. This special provision exempted U.S.
firms locating plants in Puerto Rico from federal corporate income tax. Currently, an
amendment to Section 936 has been introduced to U.S. Congress, which would create tax
breaks for local U.S.-controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) in Puerto Rico; the
legislative outcome has yet to be determined (EIU, Country Profile 2001). In addition to
the uncertain future of tax incentives for U.S. firms, there is recognition that tax
incentives alone are not enough to sustain high rates of growth. Alternative growth
strategies are recognized by Puerto Rico as critical components for growth, such as
investments in infrastructure, human resources, and technological development.
The standard of living in Puerto Rico has risen. In comparison to most other
Caribbean Islands and countries of Latin America as seen in Table 3.2 below, Puerto
Rico ranks as one of the largest economies in the region.
Table 3.2 1990 Real GDP per Capita of Select Caribbean, Central and South American Countries
(in 1985 international dollars)
Rank Caribbean Islands Central South America
America
1 Bahamas 12,559
2 Puerto Rico 9,052
3 Barbados 7,727
4 Trinidad and Tobago 8,537 Venezuela 5764
5 Mexico 5,376
6 Chile 3,988
7 Brazil 3,912
8 Costa Rica 3,616
9 Argentina 3,505
10 Nicaragua 3,497
11 Columbia 3188
12 Panama 3,021
13 St. Lucia 2,689
14 Jamaica 2,411
15 Guatemala 2,078
16 Peru 2,041
17 Dominican Republic 2,031
18 El Salvador 1,737
19 Honduras 1,297
Source: From Penn World Tables Mark 5.5, in Baumol and Wolff; 1996.'
1 The data provided in Table 3.2 are based upon the Summers and Heston information provided for 1990
real GDP of 150 countries. They express the data in 1985 "international dollars" derived from using
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates to convert each countryg raw GDP figures into a
standardized form for comparability. Thus, the real GDP (RGDP) refers to these standardized figures.
From 1950 to 1990, the RGDP growth rate for Puerto Rico averaged 3.95% per year, following Japan
(5.8%), South Korea (5.74%), Taiwan (5.67%), Malta (5.07%, Portugal (4.23%), Cyprus (4.12%) and
Spain (4.04%). The Puerto Rican growth rate in RGDP is almost double that of any of the countries listed
in Table 3.2. (Baumol and Wolff, 1996).
According to Economic Data from the Puerto Rico Planning Board, the Economic
structure for Puerto Rico has not fluctuated much between 1996 and 2000. According to
the numbers for 2000, the top three most important contributors to GDP were
manufacturing (43%), services (33%), and retail and trade (13%). Figure 3.1 describes
the GDP by sector in detail.
Figure 3.1: GDP by Sector (2000)
1%6%
4%
43%
M Manufacturing U Other Services
o Wholesale retail and trade 0 Transport/public utilities
* Construction & quarrying 1 Agriculture
Source: From the Puerto Rico Planning Board in the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile Puerto
Rico: Basic data, 2001/2002
The contribution of the construction sector to GDP has remained constant at 3% from
1996 to 2000. Given its status as one of the largest economies of the Caribbean-Latin
American region, the potential to export and become a regional leader is tremendous.
3.1 Construction in Puerto Rico
Although the construction sector was one of the leading sectors of the Puerto
Rican economy in the 1950s and 1960s, its importance in the Puerto Rican economy has
steadily contracted in the recent decades. Construction comprised 21% of Puerto Riced
Gross National Product (GNP) in 1972, it declined to 5.9% in 1983, growing again to
approximately 11% by 1988 (Estudios Ttnicos, Inc., 1994).
In the early 1990s, Governor Pedro Rosello and the Secretary of Economic
Development and Commerce Luis Fortuno proposed a $7.78 billion government
infrastructure program which was allocated to the Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewer
Authority ($2.4 billion), the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ($1.6 billion), the
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. ($1.8 billion), Puerto Rico Highway Authority ($1.5 billion),
Solid Waste Management Disposal Agency (.62 billion) and the Port Authority ($.28
billion) (GMAEC, 1994). Although Puerto Rico enjoyed a boom in construction in the
last half of the 1990s, it has again experienced a slow down in 2001 (EIU, Country
Profile 2001).
Housing, public works projects and industrial and commercial building projects
comprise the primary construction activities of Puerto Rico. As seen in Figure 3.2 below,
housing projects have held the largest share of all construction activities (average of
25%) since 1996.
Figure 3.2: Percent of Different Construction Activities
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Source: Data from the Puerto Rico Planning Board in The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile
Puerto Rico: Basic data, 2001/2002. */* * denote that the data does not indicate why a differentiation is
made between the two "other" and "housing" project categories. One possibility is that one type of
activity is from the private sector, while the other is from the public sector.
Public works projects have primarily consisted of roads and schools. Governor
Rosellc infusion of funds into the infrastructure programs in the early 1990s most
probably explains the drastic increase in the 'other projects I"portion of construction
activity in the above figure.
3.1.1 Design-Build Experience
As described in Chapter Two, design-build is a delivery system where the client-
owner contracts with a single entity to perform both design and construction functions in
a single design/build contract. Puerto Rico has only a very recent history of design-build
experience, primarily in road and bridge construction. The Teodoro Moscoso bridge was
built in another innovative procurement approach, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) in
which the contractor is assigned responsibilities for the design, build and operation of the
system similar to the DBOM approach, but is expected then to transfer ownership to the
government. Yet, because the design-build experience has been recent, and never used
for a technologically sophisticated transportation project, Puerto Rico is limited in its
accrued expertise in design-build practices.
3.1.2 Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC)
The Quality assurance/Quality control method of ensuring quality in project
delivery is predicated upon another model of informal apprenticeship structures which
hone the skills of laborers within the construction industry. Unless the same kind of
apprenticeship structure is institutionalized formally or informally within Puerto Rico,
perhaps the QA/QC model also needs to be altered or replaced for future phases of
construction. Puerto Rican law states that in infrastructure project procurement, the
Quality Control entity must be independent from the construction contractor (Woreby,
Phone Interview, 2002).
3.2 Labor
Both U.S. federal and local labor laws are applicable to Puerto Rican firms such
as the U.S. minimum-wage law and mandatory fringe benefits (e.g., social security) law
(EIU, Country Commerce, 2001).
3.2.1 Wages
The minimum wage since 1997 has been $5.15/hour. Table 3.3 shows
comparative figures for hourly wage compensation in Puerto Rico.
Table 3.3: Hourly Compensation
Min Avg Max Bonus (%)
Executive Secretary 10.62 13.21 15.98 7.4
Group Leader 11.09 13.99 18.8 10.3
Tool and die maker 9.78 11.85 13.96 8.4
Office Clerk 8.09 10.33 12.64 7.5
Materials Handler 7.09 8.41 10 7.5
Source: Puerto Rico Manufacturers' Association, 2000 survey in EUI, Country Commerce Profile, March
200J.Notes: Typical wage and salary for large manufacturing firms in 2000. Fringe benefits are
additional.
These figures can be compared to the federal wage determinations for construction.
Federal wage determinations issued by the U.S. Department of Labor under the Davis-
Bacon Acts determine prevailing wage rates to be paid on all federally funded or assisted
construction projects and are listed in Table 3.4 below:
Table 3.4: Federal Davis Bacon Wage Determination for Highway and Heavy Construction Projects
in Puerto Rico (March 2002)
Rates
CARPENTERS
CEMENT MASONS
ELECTRICIANS
IRONWORKERS
LINEMEN:
Linemen
Telephone Linemen:
Ground & Pole
LABORERS:
Laborers (unskilled)
Pipelayers
PIPEFITTERS
PLUMBERS
POWER EQUIPMENT
Asphalt luters
Backhoe
Bulldozer
Crane
Diggers
Grader
Greaser/Oilers
Loaders
Mechanics
Paver
Roller
SCRAPERS:
less than 18 CY
18 CY and over
Screedman
TRACTORS:
OPERATORS:
Fringes
5.48
5.17
5.76
5.15
5.15
5.15
5.15
5.27
5.15
5.55
6.74
8.25
6.89
6.72
5.91
6.78
5.51
6.5
6.1
6.7
less than 185 HP
185 HP and over
TRUCK DRIVERS
Source: Federal Davis Bacon Wage Determinations website
0.5
0.47
0.8
0.84
0.43
3.11
0.59
0.99
1.43
1.06
1 0.92
7 0.76
7 3.15
4 3.14
8
8.1
5.31
0.59
0.59
3.13
0.59
0.59
.3
Given these comparative figures, the average wage comparison of construction
labor at $9-$11 is not 'vorth it' According to Telly Figueroa, Technology Transfer and
Training Manager at Kiewit Construction in San Juan, citizens can earn more off of
welfare or other, less labor-intensive jobs for a similar amount of pay (Figueroa, 2002).
Tunnel diggers for Ri Piedras earned $13/hour, with double the pay for overtime.
According to one electrical installation supervisor in the Tren Urbano project, the highest
paid electrician earns $11/hr, while the entry level, uncertified electrician without a
license is paid $6/hour (Woreby, Personal Interview, 2002).
Lower wages for construction often implies that the construction jobs will only be
taken by illegal immigrants, usually Dominican. Yet, because of their marginal legal
status within Puerto Rico, there is little, if any, political protection or institutionalized
social service provision for them. With regard to the implication on construction quality,
there are two potential choices to facilitate change in the quality of labor recruited for
construction: 1) increase wages, in which, case better candidates for construction might
take those jobs; or 2) provide training to all construction laborers, even if they are illegal,
because a better quality product will result. Either way, improved training for
inexperienced workers would be required.
3.2.2 Employment Structure
The number of employed people according to major occupational group is
described in Table 3.5 below:
Table 3.5: Employed Persons by Major Occupational Group
# employed (thousands) %
Managerial and Professional 311 27%
Technical, Sales, Administrative support 301 26%
service workers 191 17%
Operatives and related occ 150 13%
Craftsmen, foremen, related occupations 115 10/0
general labor worker 57 5%
farm workers 31 3%
1156 100%
Source: June 2001 Household Survey Data from Estudios Tenicos, Inc.,2001.
Craftsmen, foremen and other related laborers make up 10% of total occupations, while
general laborers make up only 5%.
Moving from share of employment by share of occupations to share by sector,
construction and quarrying make up approximately 7% of the total share of employment
in Puerto Rico. See Table 3.6 below:
Table 3.6: Puerto Rico Structure of Employment
1990 2000
% total Actual % total Actual
(thousands) (thousands)
Agriculture 3.7 36 2.1
Financial services 3.1 30 3.6
Transport/public utilities 6.2 60 4.7
Construction & quarrying 5.7 55 7.3
Manufacturing 17.4 168 13.7
Commerce 19.2 185 20.6
Public Services 21.4 206 21.5
Others 23.1 222 26.5
Total 100 963 100 1
Source: From the Department of Labor and Human Resources, Bureau of Labor Statistics House
survey in The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile Puerto Rico: Basic data, 2001/2002
The percentage share of construction employees follows public serv
commercial, and manufacturing, but is ahead of transport, finance and agricult
Occupying the middle range of the employment structure, the industry has potentia
grow with the correct set of inputs.
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3.2.3 Labor Unions
Trade Unions have never been a strong force in Puerto Rico. According to
Operations and Maintenance Architect for STT, Ricardo Medina, the plumbers,
electricians, and machinists/heavy equipment operators are organized, while carpenters
are not (Medina, Personal Interview , 2002). The Labor Organizations Committee is a
union umbrella group consisting of independent unions and three union federations:
Concilio de Trabajadores (Workers' General Council), Central Puertorriquena de
Trabajadores (Puerto Rican Workers'Central) and Federaci6n del Trabajo (AFL-CIO).
According to the former head of the AFL-CIO in Puerto Rico, Guillermo Reynolds,
however, even these groups have not had much power (Reynolds, Personal Interview,
2002).
Public-sector unions (i.e., government employees) were legalized in 1998,
providing collective-bargaining rights but no right to strike, and comprise the majority of
unionized workers on the island (EIU, Country Commerce, 2001). According to the
Puerto Rico Department of Labour and Human Resources, the percentage of unionized
workers is 7%. Including members of brotherhoods, employee associations or other
organizations, another 9% is represented (EIU, Country Commerce, 2001). Transport is
one sector with high rates of unionized workers, consistent with the strength of organized
labor within government.
Although union activity is low, a limited number of professional associations do
exist on the island. The Association of General Contractors/Asociaci6n de Constructores
(AGC) is a professional organization of general contractors who are mostly interested in
housing. Recognizing the need for skills development, the AGC created its own trade
education division The AGC has also formed a council comprised of 12 construction-
industry associations, including electricians'and plumbers'groups.
3.2.4 Shortage of Skilled Labor
In the late 1990s, Puerto Rico experienced a construction boom, which has
translated into a large construction labor shortage. During the 1990s, a variety of
construction projects began at once, with Tren Urbano commencing construction and the
Superaqueduct and Port. In February 2001, Puerto Rico had 10,527 licensed engineers
and surveyors active in their professions, according to the Engineers and Surveyors
Association (EIU, Country Commerce, 2001). In 1997, the average unemployment rate
was 13.5%; of the 48,000 construction jobs available, 15% were unfilled (Casellas,
1997).
The EIU Country Commerce Profile (2001) indicates that the large amount of
construction which led to a shortage of skilled workers led to an increase in illegal
immigrants. One method of solving the labor shortage was to import Mexican labor.
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents arrested 49 Mexican Laborers
in February of 2000 (Puerto- Rico-Immigration," Financial Times 26 February 2000).
Compounding the labor shortage, natural disasters have also inhibited
construction performance during the 1990s. In the fall of 1998, Hurricane Georges swept
through the island of Puerto Rico. The Federal Emergency Management Agency utilized
trucks for disaster relief and re-construction, not only tying up vehicles, but materials and
equipment vendors as well (Cho, 2000).
It is not merely the sheer numbers of laborers that are lacking within the Puerto
Rican construction industry, but the lack of skilled laborers. The need for skilled
laborers, especially in the metro areas, has reached alarming proportions, " Jorge
Redondo, president of Redondo Construction, told the periodical, Caribbean Business
(Casellas, 1997). According to a survey conducted by the AGC, heavy-equipment
operators, masons, and steel-bar installers were in highest demand, followed by
electricians and plumbers (Casellas, 1997).
Handiwork and craftsmanship in the mainland U.S. has an external certification
process which demarcates the skill level and competence of specific trades. Certification
would serve as a strong indicator of an individuabl capability, and provide an official
pre-requisite for recruitment and qualification for trade jobs. In Puerto Rico, however, no
such certification process exists for welders, bricklayers, heavy equipment operators, and
masons -trades that are crucial to the work of the rail construction (Medina, Personal
Interview , 2002). The lack of certification requirements results in a failure provide an
institutional validation of quality work criteria. The European model of paper
qualifications for construction craftsmanship is a continuum, from an apprentice to a
journeyman and finally a master (Feretti, Personal Interview, 2002).
3.3 Institutions for Skills Development
A major issue confronting companies conducting work on the island is
strategizing for an effective mix of on-island labor with less experience and the more
costly option of importing off-island labor. An important influence on such decision-
making processes is an assessment of the general status of education provided by the
existing public education systems on the island. The cheapest on island pool of labor is
illegal immigrants. Regardless of the origin, the quality of the work is going to suffer if
the workers are not skilled. Therefore, a lack of care and investment into the workers
will result in poor quality work. Blaming a workeid status due to racial or even
immigration violations will not get the job done.
The educated labor force has been marketed as an enticement for firms to locate
within Puerto Rico. Indeed, the Puerto Rican population is among one of the most
educated in Latin America, and does not trail far behind the mainland U.S., as seen in
Table 3.7 below.
Table 3.7: Educational Enrollment*
Primary School Secondary School Higher
(University)
Education
Country 1965 1983 1965 1983 1965 1983
Puerto Rico 990/0 104% 56% 76% 21% 49%
Average of selected Latin American and 93% 103% 24% 48% 5% 15%
Caribbean countries**
United States 106% 100% 63% 85% 40% 56%
Source: From the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population, Detailed Characteristics 1960,
1970, 1980 in Baumol and Wolff; 1996. * Primary school enrollment, as a percentage of total primary
school age group; Secondary School enrollment, as a percentage of total seconary school age group;
Higher education, as a percentage of university age group. **Countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad &
Tobago, Venezuela.
As seen above, enrollment rates are nearly universal for primary school. The Department
of Education coordinates the public-school system for the island. The education in Puerto
Rico is free up to the secondary level, while tertiary (i.e., higher, post-secondary
education) and professional training require tuition fees. Adult literacy is over 90% (EIU
Country Profile, 2001).
The Education Department has $100 million budget to construct vocational
schools from 1997-2001. Schools in Fajardo, Arecibo and San Sebastian were under
construction in 1997, while $21 million school for Ponce was established. It is hoped
that the number of trade school graduates relevant to the construction industry would
increase by 18-20% (Casellas, 1997).
The University of Puerto Rico is organized similarly to a U.S. state university; in
the 2000/01 academic year, 71,000 students were enrolled in 11 campuses (EIU, Country
Commerce 2001). In addition, private universities and multiple vocational schools exist
in the country.
Table 3.8: Institutions with Occupational Offerings (1999)
Institutions with Occupational Offerings Total
Area Vocational School 4
Vocational high School 12
High School with Vocational Department 9
Specialized School 6
Specialized Vocational Center 6
Academic High School with Vocational Offering 107
Other Institutions 44
Total 188
Source: Estudios Tenicos, Inc. 2001.
The number of vocational programs being offered provides an indication of the
opportunities for skills development through public programs. It does not, however,
provide information on current levels of the population actually being equipped with the
relevant skills. Table 3.9 provides data from 1999 on the raw numbers of students
enrolled within the respective technical programs.
Table 3.9: Number Enrolled in Public School Sector Vocational and Technical Education (1999)
Program Occupational Nonoccupational Totals % of total
Home Economics 2161 65876 68037 44%
Industrial Arts 255 37378 37633 24%
Industrial Education 15638n/a 15638 100/
Business Education 14019n/a 14019 90/0
Marketing Education 8862n/a 8862 6%
Agricultural Education 1142Y 4921 6068 4%
Technical Education 2322n/a 2327 2%
Health Occupations Education 1622n/a 1622 1%
Total 46031 108175 154206 100%
Source: Estudios Tinicos, Inc. 2001.
As described in Chapter Two, the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Training Administration, Office of Apprenticeship Training, Employment and Labor
Services (OATELS) has established a State Apprenticeship Council (SAC) for Puerto
Rico. According to Nick DeLapy, Deputy Director of the New Jersey, New York, Puerto
Rico and Virgin Islands region of the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Training
Administration, Office of Apprenticeship Training, Employment and Labor Services, the
SAC in Puerto Rico has been inactive for two years. In fact, a scheduled compliance
review of the situation in Puerto Rico is scheduled in the near future.
The preceding discussion of public opportunities for technical enhancement is not
a prescription or argument for exclusive use of these existing programs. In fact, the large
number of graduates and shortage of construction laborers indicate that there is a
disconnect between the tertiary and technical education being offered, and the kinds of
occupations and skills needing to be filled.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows two major ideas. First, the Puerto Rican economy may have a
role for an expanding construction sector, both for internal GDP growth and external
export within the Caribbean and Latin American Region. Second, the figures describing
the construction industry characteristics give mixed signals. On the one hand, the number
of available skilled workers is perceived to be in short supply, while on the other hand,
plentiful public sector educational and technical programs exist. One explanation for this
disconnect may lie in the need for the public sector education sector to link up more
tightly with the private sector projects that are currently in progress on the island.
A tight public-private partnership, or at least coordination and collaboration
between the two sectors, would provide mutual benefits: jobs available for those
educated within the technical skills programs, and appropriate skills that are critical and
timely for the contractors currently conducting the work. This would free up the private
sector from having to shoulder the entire burden of skills development and training while
at the same time meetings its objective of having a continuing stream of ready laborers.
Similarly, the public sector technical education programs would be improved in its
practicability of education offered, rather than being limited to skills and techniques that
may be rendered moot and no longer applicable to current industry standards.
CHAPTER 4
THE TREN URBANO EXPERIENCE
Training synchronizes the experiences of everyone.
- Hassan Sawan, Contract Manager for Bayam6
CHAPTER OVERVIEW
In this chapter, I assess the construction quality performance among the
Alignment Section Contract (ASC) Contractors and training. First, I provide an overview
of the Tren Urbano project, including a review of the major actors involved in project
delivery. Second, I review the obligations for training and technology transfer as written
within the contract documents for each of the ASC contractors. Third, I assess the and
compare construction performance of the ASC contractors by looking briefly at
percentage completion to date, and analyzing the number of nonconformance reports
(NCRs). Fourth, I identify three general construction challenges as gleaned from
extensive interviews and analysis of other studies: design difficulties, quality control
difficulties, and implementation difficulties. Finally, I review some best practice
anecdotes of training conducted among the ASC contractors.
4.0 Project Description
Tren Urbano (TU) is a fixed guideway rail transit system of the San Juan
Metropolitan Area created to serve as the core for a multimodal transportation system.
The idea has been discussed for decades, but the present project began in 1989, when the
PRDTPW first proposed the system to alleviate the traffic congesting the urban roadway
networks of San Juan. The Tren Urbano system consists of a 17.2 km (approx. 12 mi)
Dual-Track Heavy rail line, consisting of 9.3 km of (52%) elevated structures, 6.5 km
(40%) of grade and retained cut structures, a 1.4 km (8%) tunnel, 16 stations and storage
and maintenance yard. The expected ridership of the Tren Urbano System is 115,000
passengers per day with travel time of approximately 30 minutes from end to end.
The estimated total project cost is currently $2.036 billion (2002 estimate). Of
that total, the U.S. government is providing approximately $1 billion, $307 million of
which is directly from the discretionary funds for transit from the federal government
(FTA Section 5309 New Start funds described below), $259 million from FTA 'flexible"
funds2 , $141 million from FTA Section 5307 funds, and a $300 million TIFIA 3 award in
recognition of the national and regional significance of the project. The remaining cost is
financed through local funding through local revenues raised from the Puerto Rico
Highway and Transportation Authority (PRHTA). The receipt of federal funds obligates
Tren Urbano to comply with federal regulations, such as the American Disabilities Act,
Labor standards, OSHA, and prevailing wage"(Davis-Bacon Act) laws.
This unprecedented system qualifies for what the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) deems a New Starts program. The New Starts program is a discretionary fund
administered by the FTA for "supporting locally-planned, implemented, and operated
transit 'guideway' capital investments" such as heavy rail, light rail, commuter rail and
even bus rapid transit systems. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-
21) authorized $8.44 billion in Section 5309 for funding through fiscal year 2003.
Eligibility for FTA Section 5309 New Starts funding is limited to any rail line or other
fixed guideway system with a separate right-of-way used exclusively for mass
transportation or high occupancy vehicles (FTA, New Starts, 2002).
Tren Urbano was designated as one of five demonstration projects for a Turnkey
Demonstration project by the FTA in 1993, under the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA). As a fast-track turnkey system, the contracts for the design and
construction of the Tren Urbano system have been established as design-build and
design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) arrangements. Tren Urbano is not, in the purest
sense, a full turnkey project; rather it is a split turnkey contract. In a split turnkey, the
systems work is separated from the civil work (Enfiedjian, 1997). Thus, the alignment
of Tren Urbano has been divided into seven subsections. Six of the sections were
2 A provision included in ISTEA and TEA-21, flexible funds can be used either for transit or highways,
based on local planning priorities rather than restrictive program eligibility definition (FTA website).
3 Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998, part of TEA-21
awarded to joint venture partnerships between international and Puerto Rican civil
engineering contractors, while the remaining portion plus responsibilities of
commissioning, integrating, and overseeing the entire system were given to another
major contractor.
The objectives of the Tren Urbano procurement strategy as stated within a report
prepared by the consultants to the PRHTA, the General Management and Architectural
and Engineering Consultants (GMAEC, 1994), were to:
e Control interfaces between the separate subsections
e Minimize costs and encourage private funding finance
e Ensure operations-driven design
e Accelerate start and completion of construction
e Maximize technology transfer
e Promote owner control
Another objective of this approach was to ensure a 'inore stable and predictable
level of operational quality and operating cost." (TU Office, 1998). The expected
benefits of the DBOM approach included an increase in technical expertise at all levels,
more opportunity for local participation, and flexibility in scale and scope.
Major Project Delivery Actors
As Figure 4.1 below shows, the project delivery mechanism of Tren Urbano
involves many actors from both the public sector and the private sector.
Figure 4.1: Tren Urbano Project Delivery Method
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The client owner of the project is the government of Puerto Rico, namely the
PRDTPW through the auspices of the PRHTA. The Tren Urbano office was established
initially for the design and construction of the Tren Urbano project, rather than as a
separate transit organization. The GMAEC operates and supports the Tren Urbano
office staff with technical consulting services. Established in 1994, the GMAEC is
comprised of a joint venture between the U.S. mainland private firns of Daniel, Mann,
Johnson & Mendenhall and Frederic R. Harris Inc. with San Juan-based engineers,
Eduardo Molinari and Associates and Barrett and Hale and Associates. In 2000, the
GMAEC housed 150 people, not including staff of the PRHTA (Cho, 2000).
The TU office not only houses private sector entities, but public sector entities as
well. The PRHTA staffs the top- level managers of the project. Additionally, the FTA
staffs an in-house consultant at the TU office to provide project management oversight
(PMO) with TU staff through regular monthly and quarterly meetings. The FTA and TU
staff meet regularly through quarterly meetings (Alvarez, Personal Interview, 2002).
According to the design-build procurement strategy, the contractor is given the
responsibility to ramp up the initial 30% design provided by the TUO to 100% of the
design concept. Although the final design is left to the discretion of the contractor, the
PRHTA can intercede at any time to request changes.
The private sector contractors are just as varied and numerous as the public sector
client-owner of Tren Urbano. The six civil engineering Alignment Section Contracts
(ASCs) are composed of multiple actors consisting of principals, subconsultant designers,
subcontractors for fixed facilities, subcontractors for quality control, and subonctractors
for the systems (STT only- for all trackwork, power, communications, train, electric,
vehicles, operations control center) (Sheehan et. al, 1998). As seen in Figure 4.1 above,
the contractors and subcontractors are a mix of mainland U.S., international, and local
Puerto Rican firms:
e The Mexican-based I.C.A. is in a joint venture with the San Juan-based
Miramar for the Bayam6n Contract ( ASC 1).
e One of the most established Puerto Rican firms, Redondo, partners with the
Spain-based Entrecanales for the Ri Bayam6n (ASC 2) , Centro Milico
(ASC 4,5), and Villa Neviez Contracts(ASC 6). Entrecanales is a Colombian
firm, brought in because of their experience with design-build in Medellin,
Columbia (Ardila, 2002).
e The joint venture of Kiewit Construction, Kenny Construction Co., Chicago,
and H.B. Zachary Co. (KKZ) are partnered with managing designer CMA
Architects & Engineers (CMA) for the under ground tunneling portion of the
project in the Pd Piedras Contract (ASC 7). The Omaha-based Kiewit
company has worked on over 100 tunnel projects in the continental U.S.,
including highway sections through the Rocky Mountains, passenger train
tubes below San Francisco Bay, and sewage tunnels linking Boston to the
Atlantic Ocean (Construction Hurdles' The Omaha World, 18 April 1999).
e The Spain-based Necso, which is a joint venture including Entrecanales, is
partnered with Puerto Rican Redondo for the Hato Rey Contract (ASC 8,9).
* Finally, the Siemens Transit Team (STT) was awarded the Systems Test
Track and Turnkey (STTT) in 1996. The contract includes the purchase of
rolling stock, design and installation of systemwide components and the
coordination of the interface between the separate alignment segments,
construction of the civil segment consisting of the Torrimar and Los Lomas
stations, and the operation and maintenance of Tren Urbano Phase 1 for a
period of five years, with a potential for a five year extension. The STT is a
partnership led by international contractor Siemens, with Puerto Rican firm
Juan Requena Associates and U.S. mainland firm for operations and
maintenance, Alternate Concepts. Parsons Brinckerhoff is the subcontracted
quality control firm, with the construction subcontracted to a joint venture of
Redondo-Perini.
May 4.1: Tren Urbano Alignment Section Segments
Source: Adapted from Tren Urbano Website, 2000
Each of the Prime contractors were selected based on their fulfillment of certain
minimal performance standards and their estimated bids. According to a report by Booz-
Allen & Hamilton, Inc. (1999), the proposals were evaluated based on three major criteria
and sub criteria. The major categories for evaluation were Category I: Experience,
Technical and Management, Category II: Price, and Category II: Financial Capacity/Risk.
The Category I: Experience, Technical and Management sub-criteria included:
e Individual integrity records4 , past performances of contractors, subcontractors
and key personnel evaluated based on tonsistent, effective, and successful"
work on previous projects.
After the bidding process, the owner of Redondo was indicted for corruption, but due to the legally
binding contracting and selection process, the selected contractor could not be overturned or dismissed
(Salvucci, Personal Communication, 2002).
* Minimum technical qualifications established by the PRHTA, such as
evidence of successful completion of comparable construction projects within
the last 5 years, followed by further evaluations based on fixed facilities
design and fixed facilities construction criteria.
* Experience and qualifications of key management team personnel,
organization and management plans, as well as technology transfer and
training programs, and PRHTM Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE)
requirement as basis for evaluation.
4.1 Contractual Obligations for Training and Technology Transfer
The contract documents for each of the Tren Urbano ASC contractors make some
mention of training. Each of the contracts contains details about a technology transfer
clause, yet the portions on training vary by contract. Table 4.1 lists the type of training
included within the contracts.
Table 4.1: Contractual Technology Transfer and Training Requirements by Segment
Alignment Section Contractor Training/Tech. Transfer Date of Contract
Requirements
Bayam6n: ASC 1 Ica-Miramar General training clause; 1 August 1996
technology transfer
Ri Bayam6n: ASC 2 Redondo- General training clause; 26 February 1997
Entrecanales technology transfer 9_
Centro MIico: ASC 4, 5 Redondo- General training clause; 9 January 1997
Entrecanales technology transfer
Villa Nevirez: ASC 6 Redondo- On-the-job-training clause; 16 June 1997
Entrecanales technology transfer
1U Piedras: ASC 7 KKZ-CMA On-the-job-training clause; 18 April 1997
1_ Technology transfer
Hato Rey: ASC 8,9 Necso-Redondo On-the-job-training clause; 29 May 1997
technology transfer
Systems and Test Track Siemens Transit Technology transfer 26 June 1996
Turnkey Contract + Team
Source: U.S. DOT, FTA, Government of Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority, Contract
Book 1: General, Phase I of Tren Urbanofor Bayam6n, M Bayam6n, Systems and Test Track Turnkey,
Centro Mlico, Villa Nevdrez, M Piedras, Hato Rey
4.1.1 Technology Transfer
A prominent component of the Tren Urbano project is the $10 million
Technology Transfer Program. The Tren Urbano Technology Transfer Program is
geared towards professional capacity building for students with college degrees; it,
therefore, is not intended to address the vocational or technical training needs that might
arise from construction labor. The following is a sample of one Contractoid proposal for
technology transfer:
Example: Schedule of Technology Transfer Options for the Bayami Contract
University Program $59,730.00
- Up to 3 high school scholarships for aptitude in science and math
- Up to 3 university scholarships for aptitude in architecture, engineering, construction
management per student per year- Field trips to office and site
- University lectures by personnel from office
- Student seminars: lecture and discussions, 2 day seminars
- Student mentorship
- Award program for faculty members with excellency in leadership and academic knowledge
in architecture, civil engineering and construction management
Student Internship Program $103,815.00
- Up to 3 interns in architecture, engineering, construction management
- Student internships abroad in the Ica offices or sites of Mexico for 2 months, all expenses
paid
Employee Mentorship Program $ 93,852.00
- Employee internships abroad in Ica office and construction sites in Mexico for local entry
or mid career employees from Puerto Rico
Peer Partnership Program $1,454.00
- Professional seminars for 2 day seminars
Other proposed tech transfer enhancements
- Publications, series related to Tren Urbano, one year quarterly publication
Source: Bayam6n Contract, 1996
4.1.2 General Training Clause
The general training clause includes slight variations of the following:
Training Program shall be consistent with and be further developed based
upon the training section of Contractorg proposal as approved by the
Authority. Any differences from, or changes to, the proposed and
approved Training Program shall require approval by the Authority.
Guidelines and requirements for the Training Program are specified in the
applicable Contract Exhibit.... Costs are included in the contract price.
(ASC 1,2,4,5 contracts)
4.1.3 On-the-job Training
The Ri Piedras Contract for Phase I includes a section for an On-The-Job
Training (OJT) Program to be approved by PRHTA and implemented by the Contractor.
The purpose of the OJT Program is to develop trainees who successfully complete the
training to the full journeyman level"for trades specified in the Contract Documents.
According to the contract, a journeyman is defined as a craftsperson considered to be
tapable of performing all the major duties of a particular trade." The Contractor is
obligated to identify the trades involved in the work where on-the-job training will be
provided.
The primary objective of the OJT Program is explicitly stated as training
minorities and women who are traditionally underrepresented in the construction
industry. Thus a 'ystematic and direct recruitment"of individuals fitting the bill is
obligatory. In particular, women are to be given special consideration according to a
under-utilization index detailed in the PRHTA Affirmative Action Plan. No trainees who
previously completed a training course leading to journeyman status or employed in the
trade are eligible, although participation for a training program in another trade is
allowed. Hence, the program is truly targeted to those without previous experience
within a particular trade.
Participants of the OJT Program are full-time employees of the Contractor and
subject to all laws applicable to other regular employees, including the payment of at
least federal minimum wage and fringe benefits. The Contractor is also obligated to
provide a copy of the OJT Program to each trainee and the Contractor in charge of the
work, as well as necessary materials for training. Apprenticeship programs would qualify
for the OJT if registered with the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Apprenticeship
and Training, or Puerto Rican agency recognized by the Bureau, or approved by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Bureau of Apprenticeship and
Training. Offsite training that does not exceed 50% of the total training is permitted
within the terms of the contract. In the provisions of the contract, on-the-jobtraining is to
occur throughout the construction under the contract for training intervals of six months
or longer. Within each training interval, the OJT Program is to provide training for five
or more trainees. Once the trainee successfully completes the OJT Program, the
Contractor provides the trainee with a certificate certifying the type and length of training
completed satisfactorily.
The Contractor is obligated to receive approval for a proposed OJT Program,
including a training schedule corresponding to the Contractoig construction schedule,
"prior to commencing any Work." (Contract documents, italics mine). Records of
persons employed under the OJT Program, including payroll records and weekly
summary of training are required to be kept on site by the Contractor. Penalties for not
providing the training for the approved OJT Program include the withholding of payment
equal to three times the wages that would have been earned by the trainees if the training
had been provided. Similarly, if the Contractor withholds wages or compensation due
to the trainee, the PRHTA can pay the applicable amount directly to the trainee and
withhold three times that amount from the payment to the Contractor for the work.
The costs of training obligations within the approved OJT Program are included
in the Contract Price; thus, the PRHTA pays for the training. Within the Special
Provisions for the Contractor in Article 5, the Contractor is to allocate at least $250,000
per year during the term of the Contract.
If the Contractor subcontracts portions of the work, the training can be arranged
by the Subcontractor as long as the delegation of training obligations is explicitly set
forth. The Contractor, however, retains primary responsibility for ensuring compliance
with the approved OJT Program.
4.2 Construction Performance Comparisons
This section discusses the construction performance comparisons among the ASC
contractors. The following describes the degree of design completion and construction
challenges confronted, as well as identification of explicit training provisions (formal,
limited and informal) and the type of training that was successful and unsuccessful.
The segments of the Tren Urbano Alignment are diverse, and pose different
challenges to each of the ASC contractors. Generally, the types of construction work on
TU consist of laying the track/guideway, constructing the fixed facilities, and conducting
the electrical wiring and integration. The following table summarizes the contractor,
assigned contract sections, elements within the contract, type of alignment and progress
of each of the TU sections:
Table 4.2: Alignment Progress as of 31 December 2002
Contractor Segment Contract Alignment % Complete
Design (CA) Construction
Bayam6n
ASC 1
d Bayam6n
ASC 2
Centro Me1ico
ASC 4,5
Villa Nevamz
ASC 6
KKZ-CMA Ri Piedras
ASC 8
Necso-
Redondo
STT
Hato Rey
ASC 9
STT
Ica-Miramar
Redondo-
Entrecanales*
Bayam6n Station
Deportivo Station
Bayam6n Guideway
Jardines Station
Ri Bayam6n Guideway
Las Lomas Station
San Francisco Station
Centro M1ico Station
Centro Mico Guideway
Cupey Station
Villa Nevsoz Guideway
Rb Piedras Station
Universidad Station
RI Piedras Tunnel
Pinero Station
Domenech Station
Roosevelt Station
Hato Rey Station
Sagrado Coraz6n Station
Hato Rey Guideway
Torrimar Station
Martinez Nadal Station
Storage & Maintenance
Facilities
STT Guideway
Interface/commissioning
100 92
n/a n/a
Source: Ricardo Alvarez, Tren Urbano Project Manager, Presentation 8 January 2002; Alignment and
Cost figures from Rodriguez 1996 and GMAEC 1994. Notes: *Redondo-Entrecanales is also a
subcontractor to STT and responsiblefor all the trackwork of the system.
While nearly all sections of the guideways are complete, the fixed facilities are taking
considerably more time to finish than originally anticipated. Originally, the targeted
service opening date was November, 2001.
A detailed analysis of the scheduling delays is outside the scope of this thesis, but
the above table of percentage completion provides a cursory indication of the varied
performance among the ASC contractors. In assessing the progress of each section,
however, among other factors, one must take into consideration a) when the job was
Elevated
Elevated
At Grade
At Grade
At Grade
Elevated
Undergrnd
At Grade
100
91
100
100
100
98
98
98
100
98
100
100
100
100
85
75
75
85
80
100
100
100
100
begun and b) the difficulty of the job. For instance, the lower percentage of completion
in the Hato Rey contract can be explained in part by the fact that it was the last contract
to be awarded and so had the least amount of time for work. Nonetheless, all are beyond
the contractually specific completion date.
Interestingly, one of the most complex and technically sophisticated jobs is that of
the Rio Piedras segment. 1.8 km of underground track plus two stations under historic
buildings present the most technically sophisticated portion of the project. According to
the 20-year Kiewit veteran and district manager in Puerto Rico, the Rio Piedras project
was one of the more challenging jobs"he had ever seen (Construction Hurdles,"The
Omaha World 18 April 1999). The historic buildings can not be disturbed, and the streets
are narrow and winding. Tunneling under the business district of Rio Piedras has lead to
the discovery of either leaks or unknown utilities. According to 1999 estimates, the 105
supervisors directed a workforce peaking at approximately 500 people. Yet, the Rio
Piedras contract is one of the more effectively constructed portions of the alignment
section in terms of scheduling and quality.
Beyond percentage of completion, another indicator which attempts to more
precisely estimate the quality performance of the ASC contractors is the number of
nonconformance reports (NCR) written for each segment. Nonconformance reports are
evaluations conducted by the Quality Control (QC) inspectors detailing various aspects of
construction work which do not conform to the agreed upon design/construction
specifications. The following table documents the number of nonconformance reports to
date.
Table 4.3: Nonconformance Reports (NCR) to Date (March 2002)
Prime Contract Start Months Job Total Indicator 1: Indicator 2:
Contractor Segment Date of work Difficulty NCRs (NCR/months) (NCR/(cost/
(Cost in time))
$mill.)
Ica-Miramar Bayam6n Aug-96 68 75 357 5.3 323.7
ASC 1
Redondo- Ri Bayam6n Mar-97 61 35.2 203 3.3 351.8
Entrecanales* ASC 2
Centro Jan-97 63 71.8 534 8.5 468.6
Melico
ASC 4,5
Villa Nev6mez Jun-97 57 47 362 6.4 439.0
ASC 6
KKZ-CMA Ri Piedras Apr-97 60 225.1 377 6.3 100.5
ASC 8
Necso- Hato Rey Jun-97 57 175 550 9.6 179.1
Redondo
ASC 9
STT- Redondo STT Jul-96 69 137.7 238 3.4 119.3
Perini Joint
Venture
Source: Latch, 2002; Rodriguez, 1996. Note: NCRs on file to March 2002; Cost estimate of 1996.
To account for the variations in each job due to duration of work and difficulty of the job,
two other factors were included in the assessment. The number of months of work on-
the-jobwas considered to start at the date of the contract and continue to now; thus the
total months of work is equal to the total months since the contract was first issued. The
estimate used to best reflect the degree of job difficulty is the value of each contract
segment (US $ cost).
The number of NCRs were standardized for comparison in two ways. Indicator 1
only takes into consideration the number of months on the job, describing the average
number of NCRs for each month. Indicator 2 attempts to capture both time and job
difficulty (cost) by dividing the number of NCRs by the monthly rate of cost. This
provides an average ratio of NCRs per monthly rate per contractor. In comparing
Indicator 2, Kiewit stands out as having one of the best records among ASC contractors
(100.5 NCRs per monthly rate). The highest number of NCRs per monthly rate is over
four times the amount of Kiewit at 468.6, held by Redondo-Entrecanales for the Centro
Medico segment.
The factors are estimated values and do not completely depict the reality of the
situation as accurately as one would like. The number of NCRs, for instance, are only the
official documentation of problem areas; more problems could have arisen which
required change but were not documented. Moreover, the construction work did not
occur on a continuous basis from the start of the contract. Also, the contract values do
not necessarily purely reflect job difficulty alone. With the understanding that all the
figures provided are mere estimates, however, they nevertheless provide a first cut at
attempting to assess the differences in ASC performance.contractors. The following
describes the degree of design completion and construction challenges confronted, as
well as identification of explicit training provisions (formal, limited and informal) and the
type of training that was successful and unsuccessful.
4.3 Construction Challenges
Based off of in-depth interviews with 25 individuals among the TU offices and ASC
management offices, three general areas of construction challenges have been identified:
design difficulties, quality difficulties and implementation difficulties.
4.3.1 Design Difficulties
Portions of the construction quality can be attributed to difficulties with design.
The stages of design for the civil contract begin with Category 1 client drawings, i.e., the
30% TUO designs, followed by Category 1 modified drawings (modifications that are
Willingly recognized'by the ASC to match the field where alignment changes are made
and a new baseline design is established from a feasible civil construction perspective)
and finalized with a design issued for construction (design after a survey of the guideway
and data for the building(s) has been collected). As Built drawings are the sketches after
a survey of the built track; if there are mistakes, the contractor must go back refit the
work. The Design Review process is, according to Joe Feretti, 'andisciplined"and
suffers from coordination problems feretti, Personal Interview, 2002). The design
process involves multiple actors and approval processes, beginning with a 30% design
provided by TUO, then an initial design by the Contractor, design approval by TU/STT,
the implementation of the design by a separate contractor, followed by yet another
subcontractor in charge of quality control and quality assurance. At each stage, potential
for dispute or lack of appropriate information exists, which is especially debilitating for
problems requiring immediate response.
The difficulties of design can occur at any stage of the design process, and
become progressively more difficult to manage as the construction progresses.
Construction begins with a structural plan, not an architectural plan (de Lemos, 2002).
The original designers have not been allowed to participate in the design-build
construction. Thus, the contractors'own designers have made the on-site design
decisions (Mirandez, Personal Interview, 2002), leaving more room for straying from the
original specifications. Once the construction work is complete, the client-owner loses
leverage to force a contractor to go back to fix the original job and is vulnerable to
increased costs. Even if the contractor does conduct the re-work, they are often slow to
do so. Thus, establishing a process for achieving a quality outcome at the early stages is
all the more vital.
In the Bayam6n contract, the contractor I.C.A. attempted to coordinate among
three different designers located in Boston, Mexico and Puerto Rico. The lack of
coordination and communication led to poor design outcomes (Woreby, Phone Interview,
2002). For example, manholes in the elevated guideways were inaccessible because they
were placed too close to the fixed facility (station). If the manhold had been moved just
three meters, the problem could have been avoided.
In the STT contract, STT was given responsibilities for a portion of the alignment,
as well as interface and commissioning responsibilities for the whole Tren Urbano
system. The Interface Control Manual (ICM) details specifications for each of the ASCs
outlined by STT to maximize integration between the alignment subsections. An
Interface Inspection Report is generated every time there is a problem of nonconformity
to the ICM requirement. All the items listed must be cleared before STT can enter and
complete their portion of the overall system integration (i.e., power and track work). For
example, laying down the electrical wire requires a certain width and distance of wiring
conduits that must be pre-established. If the conduits are not sized or placed properly in
the construction of a facility, the integration work must halt or be delayed. As illustrated,
conformity to specifications is especially crucial for overall systems integration.
In order to more closely approach the design specifically of design-bid-build, the
initial designs issued by TUO, the levels of design specification varied by alignment
section. Greater specification was given the more difficult elements, and less was given
to the easier elements (Salvucci, Personal Communication, 2002). The prime contractor
was contracted to bring the design up to 100%, subject to approval. The average
percentage of design completion provided to the contractors was 30% (Alvarez, Personal
Interview, 2002), much higher than the 10% often cited in design-build literature. One of
the ASCs, however, lobbied to begin construction even without 100% design. The
PRHTA approved this request. Legally, the ASC was warned that they could proceed at
their own risk, subject to liabilities to fix any mistakes that could potentially ensue.
4.3.2 Quality Control Difficulties
While the design difficulties encountered in Tren Urbano primarily center around
lack of clear and finished specifications and coordination problems surrounding the
definition and clarity of those specifications, quality control difficulties arise over the
ability to uphold conformity to what can be already ambiguous specifications. According
to Puerto Rican law, the quality control must be conducted by an entity independent from
the contractor. Yet, the local Puerto Rican quality control companies had no prior
experience inspecting a rapid rail project, and were unfamiliar with the special needs of
the more technically advanced system of rapid rail. For instance, though firms are
experienced in concrete mixture processes for roadways, they are unfamiliar with
corrosion control for rapid railways. Furthermore, the limited knowledge and experience
with the content of rail specifications has been exacerbated by limitations in English and
unfamiliarity with the means of written specifications. According to once source, Puerto
Rican construction firms are accustomed to relying heavily upon drawings to carry out
the construction of jobs. But complex rail systems rely heavily upon written design
specifications, which detail technical components that are often left out of the drawings.
The lack of experience with rapid rail specifications was thus a source of difficulty for
the quality control aspect of the TU project.
In no cases did the original designers who provided the 30% designs and accepted
the 100% designs have the on-site inspection prerogative or responsibility. This may
make the responsibility for design less ambiguously that of the contractod design firm,
yet places additional responsibility and emphasis on quality control and quality
assurance. Paradoxically, the subcontracted design firm and the subcontracted quality
control firm have ethical responsibility to the client-owner but are contractually working
for the contractor.
In Bayam6n, quality control inspectors worked off the specifications provided by
the contractor I.C.A, although they were not necessarily the final approved designs. In
this case, the contractor exercised control over the quality control inspector. This
occurred for 2 years before PRHTA entered and corrected this system. With the reform,
inspectors began to report directly to PRHTA, and were released from contractor
accountability (Woreby, Personal Interview, 2002).
In Ri Piedras, the prime contractor, Kiewit, was able to negotiate an exemption
from the independent quality control requirement, and utilized their own designer, CMA,
to act as the quality control inspector. The caveat allows the designer to be the inspector,
but not the prime contractor. CMA placed their designers on-site, and coordinated with
the main office of Kiewit regularly. Thus, the designeid intentions were readily
accessible to the construction managers and supervisors.
4.3.3 Implementation Difficulties
The difficulties encountered in design and quality control may contribute in part
to more general implementation difficulties of the multiple contract design-build Tren
Urbano ASC contractor arrangements. Especially in working with inexperienced
workers, supervisors, and inspectors, ambiguity in design specificity can be a major
problem. While designs establish the transit system specifications, and quality control
monitors conformity to the specifications, the translation of the specifications from a
paper form to actual product is the process of implementation. Although each contract
ensures the criteria for the outcome of the final product, it does not specify, as Feretti puts
it, 'how to get there"( Feretti, Personal Interview, 2002). Assuming that the design
specifications and quality control mechanisms were flawless, the construction outcome
could still be of poor quality due to a lack of skill on the part of the laborers who are
physically constructing the product or even the lack of experience on the part of
management.
Whether poor quality construction results from a lack of coordination or
inadequate experience and skills, there is a role for training in addressing the design,
quality control, and implementation difficulties of construction.
4.4 Training
Expectations for training were explicit objectives of the Tren Urbano project and
clearly delineated within the contract documents. The Technology Transfer program has
proven to surpass minimum contractual obligations and target numbers. The general
training clause may have been too general, with little enforcement mechanism to ensure
that any program, if any had been submitted, was actually implemented. The on-the-
jobtraining program, while specifically addressing the need to ramp up the skills of
unskilled labor, was targeted more to disadvantaged citizens rather than open to the
general public. Its intent, therefore, was more to incorporate otherwise minimally
represented individuals within the construction industry, rather than to improve the work
product of the construction project or the industry as a whole.
Contractually, each of the ASC contractors was obligated to submit an approved
training program prospectus before construction work could begin. According to Lydia
Mercado, manager of the Tren Urbano Technology Transfer program, since the inception
of the program in 1996, each of the ASC contractors provided regular reports monitoring
the technology transfer progress that had been made (Mercado, Personal Correspondence,
2002). Both Kiewit and STT superseded the basic contract requirements. The Tren
Urbano Technology Transfer Office was also tasked to be the central source for
overseeing training progress reports. The only contractor that consistently contributed
reports, however, was Kiewit. Other contractors conducted limited training, but did not
submit regular reports. On-the-job training requirements, specific to incorporating
disadvantaged people into the construction work force, were monitored by the Civil
Rights Office of the PRHTA. As evidenced by the descriptions following, other
occasions of training occurred in limited and ad hoc forms.
According to the TU QA/QC Manager, QC folks received on-the-jobtraining
when they and their consultants took readings, how to conduct NCRs, how to conduct a
Receipt Inspection, how to check precast sound barriers, etc. The TU QA/QC office
managers and consultants attended weekly and bi-weekly quality meetings with the
Contractors and the QC inspectors, where they attempted to explain why and how quality
was to be carried out (Latch, Personal Correspondence , 2002).
4.4.1 Lord-Mass Joint Venture: Partnership at Work
The Lord Electric Company of San Juan, Puerto Rico and the Mass Electric
Construction Company of Massachusetts comprise the Lord-Mass Joint Venture (LMJV),
subcontracted by the STT. LMJV is responsible for all functions for the installation of
the train system, including power supply, signaling, train control, operations control
center, and the design and installation of the communications system. Named as one of
the more effective joint partnerships on the Tren Urbano job, LMJV facilitates learning
and communication of information through direct partnership. The management team
consists of 3 Mass managers and 2 Lord Managers, while all the labor used for the
construction is Puerto Rican. LMJV addressed the shortage of skilled labor by teaming
one experienced engineer with one superintendent electrician. Each superintendent is
then teamed with 2 to 3 foremen, who are in charge of 5-6 people work crews (Woreby,
Personal Interview , 2002).
4.4.2. Ri Piedras: Doing the Job Right
In Ri Piedras segment, Kiewit included extensive on-the-job training program.
The trainings provided by Kiewit were continuous and on-site with hands-on
demonstration and practice intimately interlinked with classroom training. The
curriculum entailed trainee-directed learning, where it was self-managed learning.
Lesson plans were developed for welders, carpenters, miners, masons, electricians and
flaggers, based on a U.S. National Construction Education Curriculum called, 'Wheels of
Learning',' tailored specifically to Rd Piedras, and a Trainer hired to train the trainees.
Welders were trained in Ri Piedras for 1-2 weeks, certified, and retained for the job.
All the foremen did the training, and, in turn, had daily morning meetings with their
crews to pass on any information or new knowledge they had gleaned. At the end of the
day, trainees would evaluate and test how well they had performed based on their new
knowledge.
4.4.3 ICA and Pre-Cast Bridge Segments
The method of concrete construction chosen for rapid rail transit bridges is a pre-
cast, post-tensioned segmental guideway. The specific method for concrete construction
of the pre-cast segments was not known before in Puerto Rico. ICA was the first ASC
contractor to do this at Bayam6n. Forty-eight hours later, however, the first segments
were demolished because of their poor quality.
In order to complete the necessary work, ICA needed to be finishing 22 segments
per week, but were only finishing 1-3 per week. An expert bridge segmental specialist
from Canada was hired, and within 2.5 months, work productivity improved
significantly. They were soon finishing 22 pre-cast segments per week, producing at a
rate which exceeded the capacity to store them (i.e., the structures were not being built
fast enough). The specialist was then put in charge constructing the structures to receive
the pre-cast segments, as well.
The consultant recognized 2-3 individuals who had the capacity to be trained
closely, and developed a mentor relationship with them. He trained them, and the
information, in turn, was funneled down. The training consisted of 1-2 hour time
segments, every 2-3 days or as often as necessary. By default, the quality control
inspectors on site were gaining skills, too, since they also were present at the time and
location of the training sessions. Although the consultant provided the training in
English, his second in command translated into Spanish (Woreby, Phone Interview,
2002). Much money was invested in him to maximize efficiency. According to Sawan,
the savings generated through the efficiency of construction, however, far surpassed the
cost of hiring him.
4.4.4 The Type of Training Counts
In a rail system, if the electricity is not properly channeled, the stray electricity
could be stored up in an improper place, ruin the rebar and deteriorate the system sooner.
The consequent operations and maintenance costs would be very high, showing up only 5
years later. To counter this, the QA/QC office hosted an Independent Inspectodg one day
seminar. The training was in the form of a lecture to a large number of people, and the
handouts and lecture were in English. According to one source, the inspectors had
limited absorption, partly due to the language barrier, and partly because of the
inundation of new information at once.
4.5 Conclusion
Varied performance among the ASC contractors are indicated through lateness in
delivery and the number of NCRs for each contractor. While the degree of job difficulty
is one factor in comparing the performances, all the ASC contractors face the same
challenges of design, quality control and implementation difficulties. The lack of final
design creates an ambiguity that causes the contractor, QA/QC firms, supervisors, and
laborers to be unclear about the detailed specifications and procedures for carrying them
out. This problem is compounded when the QA/QC firms are not experienced in transit
construction, or any other firms involved in the implementation process are unskilled.
On the one hand, the contractor could attempt to negotiate the acceptance of lower
quality work with the client-owner by preying upon schedule slippage. In the trade-off
between quality and schedule, and the constraints of political office and the desire to
complete projects within an officiag term in office, contractors can attempt to escape the
standards of high quality construction. Within the Tren Urbano experience, such a
dynamic was in play and individual contractor philosophy was a major factor in the
differences.
The ICA case exemplifies timely intervention by the client-owner, PRHTA, but
that intervention undermines the responsibility and accountability for contractor
management of the job. In the Kiewit case, the contractor accepted responsibility for
training and implemented a formal program of training for construction. In the Redondo
case, the contractor seems to willfully cause delay, confounding any attempt at a pre-
emptive training strategy.
On the other hand, the contractor could provide training in order to construct a
quality product more efficiently, resulting in quality outcomes, and improved cost and
time savings. Although the contract states the need for training, beyond the technology
transfer program, the ensuing training sessions conducted by ASC contractors were often
reactive to problems and ad hoc. The costs incurred with retrofitting work and training
sessions may have been avoided with an initial strategy for training. Moreover, the
strategy for training should be carefully planned, with an assessment of the particular
needs of the individuals to be trained. In the cases described above, training sessions
that were conducted in a language more comfortable to the low-skilled workers, in
shorter time spans over more frequent periods appeared to be more effective.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall in the transportation industry, states and public transportation agencies have
focused on buses and trains, or making capital investments such as new lines or
expansions. They have seldom focused on the people who operate the system or plan,
design and construct new lines. There has been an emphasis on physical infrastructure
without due regard to the human infrastructure required to carry out projects or operate
systems.
- Lydia Mercado, Former Technology Transfer Manager of Tren Urbano
5.0 Conclusion
As seen through a review of the literature and study of the Tren Urbano rapid rail
system, transit system construction projects are susceptible to problems of poor quality
and consequent delays and cost overruns. The lack of client-owner expertise, as well as
inexperienced contractors and construction labor, exacerbate the risks already associated
with building technologically advanced, new-start transit projects. Given these
conditions, this thesis poses the questions, 1) Does training matter for construction
quality? 2) To the degree that it does, what types of institutions and training structures
can help to ensure a quality product from inexperienced construction labor?
A limited conclusion can be drawn that, yes, training does matter. Training
matters for the public sector, because, as the guarantor of the public good, governments
are motivated to expand local capacity and skills development for economic development
purposes. The principles for this reasoning were discussed in Chapter Two, while the
specific Puerto Rican factors necessary for an assessment of the construction industry and
educational/training opportunities were discussed in Chapter Three. General education
is important for increasing the absorptive capacity of the labor pool. The resultant high-
skilled labor can provide an incentive for firms to locate and spur industrial growth.
Training also matters for the private sector, because local capacity development
can influence the construction quality outcome. The principles for this reasoning were
discussed in Chapter Two, while the case was made for private sector interest and
motivation in training in Chapter Four. Training can lead to higher quality, which, in
turn, can lead to higher profits.
Delving deeper into the answer, however, spurs on other questions such as what
kind of training, training for who, and training provided by who? In order to address
these questions and formulate a more nuanced understanding of the role for training
within the construction process, the type of procurement strategy chosen becomes
prominent. Different procurement strategies emphasize who shoulders more of the
responsibility for various portions of project delivery, such as whether the contractor or
government is responsible for design completion, coordination among multiple parties,
etc. The embeddedness of training within other project organizational and managerial
issues makes the discussion of the role of training more complex, necessary. If a
competent management is in leadership, but poorly skilled-workers are incapable of
executing and implementing the project designs, then a problem results. Conversely,
even the most sophisticated and highly skilled workers would be confounded by poor
management. Thus, understanding the role for training must be enlightened by
understanding the impacts of an overall project delivery plan/procurement strategy and
managerial competence and experience. I argue that client-owners should create an
appropriate strategy which carefully assess and matches the three factors of procurement
strategy, contractor competence, and local labor capacity (existent or potential, through
training capacity).
The following section describes the relationship between procurement strategy,
quality and training, thus addressing the first question posed by the thesis. It is argued
that successful training should be tailored to pre-empt potential breakdowns of a
particular procurement strategy. The second question of institutions needed for training
is addressed in the subsequent section. Primarily, this thesis posits that training should be
provided in a collaborative effort between the public sector, private sector, and with an
expanded role for labor unions, through apprenticeship programs and vocational/trade
schools with curriculum fitting within an overall industrial development policy of
government. This chapter finishes with a discussion of recommendations, and theoretical
contributions and potential areas for future research.
5.1 Procurement Strategy and Quality
As addressed in Chapter Four of this thesis, the construction quality problems can
be attributed to design problems, QA/QC inspection problems, and implementation
problems. In assessing the factors which influence the construction quality outcome, an
important influence on the design and construction process is the particular procurement
strategy chosen for project delivery.
The labor forced capability to execute an established procurement strategy is
assumed rather than created. Especially with new-start transit areas without local rapid
rail expertise, like that of San Juan, there is a need to address knowledge management of
low skilled construction labor as well as the higher skilled architecture, engineering, and
management skills.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the increased interest in design-build procurement
strategy for transit system construction in the U.S. is attributed to the increased
participation of the private sector in project design and construction, and even operations
and maintenance. Design-build is lauded as a key for increasing efficiency of cost and
time in the design and construction of an infrastructure project by relying upon contractor
expertise for fast-tracking -an expertise based on the proprietary knowledge that the
contractor retains from experience. The potential for increased efficiency, however, is
based upon two key assumptions: 1) contractor expertise in design as well as
construction, and the management capability to coordinate between all functions of
contracted project delivery, and 2) contractor motivation to produce a high quality
product.
The first assumption that the single entity contractor has expertise in design as
well as construction may not be true. Experienced engineering and construction
contractors may not know how to manage design, because their expertise and experience
is in construction. Problems are exacerbated if the history and experience of the
construction industry has relied upon a history of design-bid-build, where design
expertise has been completely severed from the construction process. Even value
engineering expertise, which provides a type of flexibility similar to design-build, has a
limited scope in its indicator of contractoig ability to manage design-build; value
engineering focuses on smaller-scale changes on portions of a system rather than on an
entire system.
The second assumption that the contractor is motivated to produce a high quality
product is also risky. Such reliance upon contractor responsibility runs the risk of an
inferior construction outcome based on motivations of cost minimization or faster project
completion. Ideally, the contractor would desire to create a better quality product the first
time to maximize and capture profit. Conversely, however, contractors may be motivated
by a strategy to minimize costs by producing only the lowest quality acceptable. This
plays upon governmenV motivation to have timely performance, often due to the politics
of completing a major public works project within a particular officials term of office.
The contractor may be able to take advantage of the government priority on schedule,
and produce a quicker, cheaper, lower quality product. Moreover, contractors may
deliberately delay design submission and even construction in order to create pressure on
the government to accept below quality work.
5.2 Procurement Strategy and Training
This thesis argues that in order to maximize the quality of construction in a new
transit system, the client-owners should create an appropriate strategy which carefully
assesses and matches three factors: 1) procurement strategy, whether the conventional
design-bid-build or innovative design-build arrangement, 2) contractor experience and/or
training capacity, and 3) the local labor skill level or training capacity.
Both the conventional design-bid-build and innovative design-build procurement
strategies have vulnerabilities where potential breakdown may occur in project delivery.
Identifying and addressing those vulnerabilities is important especially for the
construction of new-start transit systems in a location with limited local labor skills.
Successful training should be tailored to pre-empt potential breakdowns of a particular
procurement strategy, regardless of which procurement strategy is chosen, with emphasis
on the accountability provided by a quality assurance and quality control system. To
identify those weak spots and discuss potential training strategies, we revisit a figure
from Chapter One below:
Table 5.1: Procurement Strategy and Associated Skills
DESIGN-BID-BUILD
Very High:Provides 100% design specifications.
DESIGN-BUILD
-I I I Low~. rrovioes ~iUU~/o aesign speciiications
Client-Owner
Low: Not necessary; potential to change design Very High: Necessary to innovate and complete
Contractor specifications through value-engineering design specifications to 100%
Manage-
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Construction
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wnth construction 'capabihity in mird. vith constructionbapability in mind
Client-Owner Moderate:-Restrain payment schedule to match Moderate: Restrain payment schedule to match
construction compliance construction compliance
Moderate: Just implement 100% design Very High: Necessary to innovate and complete
Contractor specifications design specifications to 100% for quality
Manage- construction
mentt
Construction
Labor High: Emphasize construction supervision to
implement 100% design
Very High: Emphasize construction supervision
to implement 100% design or need to exercise
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Client-Owner
Very High: Reliance upon on QA/QC to Very High: Reliance upon on QA/QC to
monitor conformity to design specifications monitor conformity to design specifications
U Contractor High Very High
Manage-
mentt
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Labor
Client-Owner
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L.
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The four stages of transit construction - design, construction,
monitoring/inspection and project oversight control each identify the type of skill needed
for that particular stage. The stage and skill, in turn, are broken down into the relevant
actors of client-owner, contractor management and construction labor. Although the type
of skills needed do not vary much, which actor possesses the expertise does vary
according to the procurement strategy and the assignment of responsibility. The
following is a discussion of each of these stages in greater detail.
5.2.1 Design Specificity
In the design stage, responsibility for design is higher for the client-owner in
design-bid-build, while it is higher for the contractor in design-build. In both cases,
however, the training implication for construction labor is that designers design with
construction capability in mind. The completion of final design specifications is
important in this regard. According to another figure from Chapter One, there is a
relationship between the level of skill drawn from experience of the contractor/labor pool
and specificity of design:
Figure 5.1: Tren Urbano Skills-Design Specifications Framework
Degree of Final Design Completion
HI LO
A C
B
0*-
Again, boxes A and B illustrate situations where the specificity of design is 100%
complete and approved before construction begins (usually design-bid-build), and
construction outcome is primarily dependent upon contractodg abilities to conform to the
pre-established details. Boxes C and D refer to situations where complete designs for the
project as a whole, i.e., sum of the parts, have not been fully specified and approved at
100% before construction begins (as in design -build).
In terms of level of complete design provided by TUO initially, and in terms of
the available pool of experienced labor, all the ASC contractors fit within Box D initially.
The ASC contractor performances were varied in view of this framework. Kiewit
operated in a manner which could relegate it to Box C because the extensive training
provided to on-site construction improved skill, even with the 30% design provided by
TUO initially. It could also, however, be relegated to Box A, because the level of
approved design specification was high before construction began. Alternatively,
Redondo offered limited training, as well as starting construction off a lower level of
approved design specifications. Thus, Redondo operated in a manner that would leave it
within the Box D range.
This thesis points out that the design-build strategy assumes high level skills often
associated with experience of the labor pool available to contractors (Box C). In the case
of low level skills (Box D), the movement to a high skill -high design specification
would yield the highest quality outcome (Box A). In order to get to the ideal type, a two-
step process would be in order. First, an effective strategy could be to either move up
vertically to the realm of Box C by intensive and effective training programs, or to move
over horizontally to the realm of Box B by enforcing contractual guidelines on the degree
and breadth of complete designs necessary before construction begins. Second, the
alternative movement could follow, whereby the Box C contractor could next concentrate
on improving design specifications and the Box B contractor could focus on training to
ramp up the skill level of labor. If the capacity for particular processes or materials is
advanced, an appropriate level of training should support the advanced process.
Otherwise, a process familiar to the construction laborers may need to be utilized to
maximize implementability.
5.2.2 Construction
Depending on who has ultimate responsibility for project delivery and
management, the competence and skill level of the contractor and client-owner varies for
project oversight control. Client-owner competence must be high for design-bid-build, in
order to manage and coordinate all the contractors and conformity to specifications.
Contractor competence must be even higher, however, for design-build, given the added
need for coordination between design and construction, and the additional potential for
incomplete design or other design failures.
In both cases, there is a need for the client-owner to exercise restraint in payment
in order to elicit compliance with standards. Paying at a rate and schedule that is similar
to the actual construction would be optimal, for paying too much ahead of time
diminishes the client-owneid leverage over the contractor. The competence and
capability of who performs the management functions is a vital factor to consider in
considering procurement strategy and training implications.
In the construction stage, regardless of which procurement strategy is utilized, the
degree of construction labor skill required is high, though higher for design-build.
Implementation of designs requires strong supervision, as well as adequate design. This
need is compounded when a lack of complete design requires a use of personal
discretion, which may not be well-founded without past experience. Another training
implication at this stage is construction with an eye forward towards creating a product
which can pass quality inspections.
5.2.3 Monitoring/Inspection
Monitoring and inspecting must be proactive and simultaneous with construction,
instead of after the product has been complete. In both procurement strategies, high
reliance upon the QA/QC mechanism translates into a need for strong training of that
mechanism. In other words, training for the QA/QC inspectors may be as, if not more,
important than training the actual workmen who implement designs.
As discussed previously, and described in Figure 5.2 below, the public sector
exhibits vulnerabilities to short-term political considerations, making the need for an
accountability system for quality control and quality assurance all the more essential.
Figure 5.2: External Impediments to Quality Product/Service Outcome
Political Constraints of Public Sector Cost Minimization
Strategy of Private Sector
Public Sector Private Sector
Schedule Low Cost
Poor Quality
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Design-build works well when the perceived interest of the client-owner and contractor
are similar, and similar visions of project quality are executed. But the contractoir
perception of interest and motivation is difficult to pre-screen in the bidding process.
Making the quality of construction processes and outcome the legal responsibility of the
contractor is vital, as transferring such legal responsibility to the client-owner could
create a weakness in accountability.
Thus, a procurement strategy should evaluate the processes proposed by
competing contractors to deal with skills training specific to quality control, including it
as a basis for competition, and monitor to enforce that the winning contractor is
complying with the proposed skills plan for quality control.
5.2.4 Project Oversight Control
Depending on who has ultimate responsibility for project delivery and
management, the competence and skill level of the contractor and client-owner varies for
project oversight control. Client-owner competence must be high for design-bid-build, in
order to manage and coordinate all the contractors and conformity to specifications.
Contractor competence must be even higher, however, for design-build, given the added
need for coordination between design and construction, and the additional potential for
incomplete design or other design failures.
In both cases, there is a need for the client-owner to exercise restraint in payment
in order to elicit compliance with standards. Paying at a rate and schedule that is similar
to the actual construction would be optimal, for paying too much ahead of time
diminishes the client-owneid leverage over the contractor. The competence and
capability of who performs the management functions is a vital factor to consider in
considering procurement strategy and training implications.
5.3 Collaborative Provision of Training
The training should also be an intentional, collaborative effort between the public
education sector, the private construction sector, and an expanded labor union presence.
As seen in Figure 5.1 below, the government could set up a contractual obligation for the
private sector to provide training to its own laborers. At the same time, the government
and contractor could both shape the vocational and trade school curriculum. Such
coordination could improve the supply of relevant education and skills provided the
public sector while at the same time creating a ready pool of laborers for the private
sector. Similarly, the private sector could 'utsource"its training to the public sector
and/or labor associations with tight control over the relevance of the skills being taught
and practiced.
Figure 5.3: Collaborative Provision of Local Capacity Building
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A critical element of the collaboration would be to institutionalize informal means
of apprenticeship by strengthening labor unions. Labor union training, such as that
provided by the Carpenteid Union, would provide an invaluable source for upgrading
work skills, and reducing the monopoly of workers held by local contractors. Similarly,
Youth Apprenticeship programs could replenish construction labor shortages, provide
access to federal funds, and provide a social service of youth investment.
Training should be demand-oriented and not supply-oriented. The program
should be tailored to meet the needs, and potentially unique challenges of those needing
the training. In the case of Tren Urbano effective training meant utilizing a familiar
language in sessions over short, consistent times.
5.4 Recommendations
In the construction of future extensions, the conditions of local skill capacity
would be different due to the previous experience in Phase 1. The labor pool and
contractors are somewhat more experienced, and more aware of the challenges and
impediments to construction of transit. It is important to be aware, however, that a choice
awaits. On the one hand, the PRHTA could choose to continue with the same contractors
for future construction due to their experience and developed skills, but exercise greater
quality control and quality assurance with stronger punitive mechanisms. On the other
hand, the PRHTA could choose to use similar design-build mechanisms or to shift to
design-bid-build. A third alternative is to employ design-build, with more explicit
attention on supervisor and worker training, and best-value contractor selection rather
than low-bid. It would thus be up to the PRHTA to create a stronger requirement for
training the labor workforce, in order to have the capacity to produce quality construction
the first time.
5.4.1 Best Value vs. Low Bid
The client-owner should take advantage of the freedom from low bid in a design
build procurement strategy to pick a bid based on best-value. Although low bids may
appear low at the time of bid awards, the extra claims costs incurred due to the variety of
factors described in this thesis may result in costs far exceeding a higher bid by a more
experienced and reputable firm.
The liberty to choose a best-value bid allows greater freedom to choose a
competent and capable contractor who can manage the project better, and who may
provide a more transparent bid. Although it is difficult to pre-judge the contractor
motivation in the bidding process, a best-value scheme creates the incentive for
transparency. This counters temptations to underbid merely to win the bid, and could be
pressured to include more investment in worker training. Paying more for a more
experienced or reputable contractor can help the quality of construction because he not
only possesses the competence, but also can establish training for others.
For example, in Ri Piedras, KiewiV high bid price initially may have also been
the more honest bid. The original TU project was estimated at $1.4 billion but has
quickly escalated to a little over $2.0 billion over the 8 year lifespan of the project. Since
the total number of claims awarded over time far exceeds the differential between the
highest and lowest initial bids of a contractor, then it is likely to be more cost effective
and ensure better quality results with a best value choice.
In the bid selection process, screen the qualifications not only of the primary
contractor, but also the subcontractors with particular attention paid to training problems
and the experience of managers. Include an assessment of the local capacity before
embarking on a project, and a strategy, accountability mechanism, and schedule to help
establish the institutions and training programs necessary to produce a quality outcome.
5.4.2 100% Final Design Acceptance
In the trade-off between quality and schedule, one method of client-owner control
to ensure quality is to require 100% design acceptance before construction can begin.
Although in theory, the lower design is intended to shift risk to the contractor, in
actuality, the client owner has no means of eliciting quality before the work is finished.
Without clear, final design and specifications, both to direct the supervisors and workers
and facilitate QA/QC, ambiguity on expectations can lead to substandard work.
Taking the logic one step further, a modified design-build strategy, a 'design-bid-
design-build" strategy may be a prudent alternative to consider ( Salvucci, Personal
Communication, 2002). The modified design-build would provide an initial design
(10%) followed by a bid-design-build where construction could not commence before
100% design completion. This may be the strategy to attain benefits of the 100% design
specification of the conventional design-bid-build procurement strategy combined with
the benefits of providing flexibility to contractors with innovative capabilities in the new
design-build procurement strategy. Furthermore, such a hybrid allows the owner to retain
leverage over the contractor by ensuring quality specifications before beginning
construction. While this does not guarantee quality work product, it nevertheless allows
begins the process with a clearly-defined specification.
The requirement for 100% design acceptance establishes a precedence for training
to work by clarifying management and construction standards to which construction can
refer. Regardless of whether the design is achieved through a design-bid-build or a
design-build process, the designs are necessary to establish. Even the most skilled and
trained workers would achieve poor quality, i.e., conformance to the specified standards,
without a clear and clearly communicated plan up front. A training program is based
upon the premise that a design is created, and that the help is needed to achieve a
specified standard.
5.4.3 Quality Control Punitive Mechanism
The quality control firm must be given the real exercise of power, through the
threat of a real punitive action. This may elicit greater voluntary compliance on-site if
the inspector had the power to initiate and activate a Stop Work Order' If there are no
real punitive consequences for stopping shoddy or sub-par quality work, then there is
little motivation for the contractor to correct inferior work.
The designer may be a better alternative to conduct inspections, rather than
contracting an entirely separate inspector. This gives the designer more opportunities for
input, as well as ensures a minimum level of competence among the inspectors.
Stronger quality control establishes the accountability mechanism necessary for
training to be effective. Training to do the job right is useless if a process is established
where doing it the wrong way, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is accepted.
5.4.4 Labor Union and Vocational/Trade Schools
The role of the labor union and increasing prominence of a revamped vocational
and trade school provision of training would be of utmost importance to a revitalized
training scheme for the construction industry in general, as well as for the Tren Urbano
project in particular. Both labor unions and vocational schools have the potential to act
as a go-between, drawing upon the best that the private and public sector have to offer.
Access to governmental funds for education and training, as well as partnerships with
private sector contractors through on-the-job apprenticeship programs would improve the
public education provision of relevant training. The labor unions, also, are a vital
protector and advocate for improved wages and expanded job opportunities within
construction. Additionally, these two institutions may increase the professionalization of
construction through a heightened certification process.
5.5 Theoretical Contributions and Future Research
An important theoretical contribution of this thesis is the expansion of the
technology transfer discourse from a focus on an educated managerial class to include the
ramping-up of skills for low-skilled, often uneducated labor. This not only serves to
provide a greater local skills capacity to enhance the environment for private firms to
employ skilled labor, but also serves the public sector objective to build local skills in
depth, and in breadth. Emphasis on low-skill upgrade, particularly for the construction
industry, would result in the inclusion of more members of the general population into
the formal labor market.
Given the defined scope of this thesis, many opportunities for expanded or
complementary research exist. For instance, reasons for the discrepancy between
management incentive and construction outcome are worthy of future research. The
design-build-operate-maintain (DBOM) is a strategy to shift risk to the contractor, who
must operate the system with the consequences of poor work. Theoretically, the DBOM
for STT should have shifted all risk upon the contractor and therefore produced the best
results in quality because STT would have the added incentive of the long-term quality of
the system for operations and maintenance. Furthermore, STT and Kiewit both have
strong reputations of management expertise, as well as capable contract managers at both
firms who have impressive decades of experience in transit construction and managing
complex contracts. As the results of Chapter Four reveal, however, the two contractors
had drastically diverse outcomes, with STT as one of the worst performers, with Redondo
as their subcontractor and the Torrimar and the O&M facilities furthest behind in
schedule and significant construction quality problems. Probing into factors which
explain their differences, such as firm adaptability to new conditions, merit further
research.
In the case of Tren Urbano, a joint-venture model of knowledge transfer seemed
to be attempted. The inexperienced government (PRHTA) was partnered with
experienced private sector partners (GMAEC) in the Tren Urbano Office. Similarly, the
experienced prime contractors from U.S. mainland and foreign countries were partnered
with inexperienced subcontractors from the island. In both cases, cheaper execution and
increased learning seems to have been the goal. Further exploration into the assessment
of how this scheme did and did not work, and why, could be a potentially fruitful piece of
research that would complement the findings of this particular research.
Another issue needing further research is the question of a foreign labor
component with high skills versus local labor component requiring more training
investment. A study which evaluates the financial and social costs and benefits of
various mixes of local and foreign labor would be a complement to this study.
The focus of this thesis was on construction quality in a new transit system.
Attention to the operations and maintenance of a new transit system would also be
beneficial. Other high technology industries, such as the growing pharmaceutical
industry in Puerto Rico, as well as other high tech or service industries in developing
countries would serve as a start for such a study.
Potential implications of training as it applies to quality control measurements
could be broken down and assessed. The measurements for quality construction
performance on craftsmanship and project delivery could include the following:
e On-time or delayed delivery -How well did the contractor meet their
schedule requirements?
e Functionality - How well do the constructed products perform? In
projects with multiple factors needing coordination, how well do the
separate functions integrate?
e Aesthetics/finishings - How well does the work product meet the
designedg aesthetic intent?
e Cost overruns - How well were additional costs avoided?
e Safety - How safe are the workers?
Looking more closely at these factors, and doing a more in-depth analysis on the factors
influencing each of these categories, and identifying how training for workers could
improve these specific categories would be a valuable addition to the work established in
this thesis.
Another issue to explore in the future would be variations of the DBOM
approach. A possible variation to the DBOM approach would be to break up the contract
according to functions: tunneling, civil, finishing. The contractor could be specified
according to specialization. For portions of the project where the client-owner either has
specific standards that need to be met, or where the contractor does not have the capacity,
do a design-bid-build procurement, where 100% of the specifications are provided before
the project is put out to bid. For example, elements such as fixed facilities and guideway,
track, and signaling portions might be appropriate for design-bid-build. While elements
of significant proprietary contractor experience, such as tunneling, might best be
conducted in a design-build arrangement.
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